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
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O U T L I N E S.

O F A N

A N S W E R

T O

Dr. Priestley's Disquisitions

R E L A T I N G T O

M A T T E R A N D S P I R I T.

B Y

The Rev. RICHARD GIFFORD, B.A.

RECTOR of NORTH OKENDON, ESSEX.

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*Mea fuit semper hæc in hæc re voluntas et sententia,  
quemvis ut hoc mallet de iis qui essent idonei, suscipere,  
quam me; me ut mallet, quam neminem.*

CICERO.

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**A**BOUT a Year ago Dr. Priestley's *Disquisitions* came into the Hands of the Writer of these *Outlines*, in the Course of Circulation in a Reading Society. To preserve the Train of Reasoning, that occurred in going over the *Disquisitions*, he committed his Reflections to Paper; and he transmitted them to a Friend, to whom he sometimes communicates his Ideas, in Hopes of being told frankly, whether he had mistaken the Doctor's Arguments, or on any Point had reasoned weak-

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ly ; and it was from that Friend that the Design originated of giving them to the Public.

The Author knew not that any Answer had been published. Even Dr. *Price's* Correspondence with Dr. *Priestley* did not come in his Way till some Weeks after the *Outlines* were written. This is mentioned, to explain the Passage from *Cicero*, that stands in the Title-Page.

Dr. *Priestley* has told us, that he shall reply to his Antagonists according to the Mood, in which he finds himself. It is hoped, he will meet with little here to put him out of Humour : If the Reasoning is strong, Candour will oblige

oblige him to acknowledge it ; if it is weak, it will be easy to shew, that it is so.

The Author of the *Outlines* is, now and then, warm and earnest ; but he flatters himself, that he has not passed the Line of Decency ; and therefore apprehends, he has a fair Claim to an equal Portion of Civility and good Temper. It should, he thinks, be a constant Maxim with Disputants, *et refellere sine pertinaciâ, & refelli sine iracundiâ.* CICERO.

... ..

... ..

... ..

“ CAN you really think, Sir, that it  
 “ is a Thing of no ill Consequence  
 “ in Practice, to raise new Disputes, to  
 “ fill the Minds of weak and unstable  
 “ Men with endless Doubts and Scruples,  
 “ and the Mouths of the Profane with  
 “ new Topics of Scepticism and Raillery,  
 “ against the most important and funda-  
 “ mental Doctrines of all Religion? Or  
 “ can you be persuaded, that such Men,  
 “ as are pleased with some of your No-  
 “ tions, will as readily admit all the rest  
 “ also?” “ Is it not very obvious to  
 “ perceive, that profane Men will very  
 “ gladly and with great Advantage make  
 “ Use of all your Arguments for the na-  
 “ tural Mortality of the Soul, and drop  
 “ the following Parts of your Hypo-  
 “ thesis? &c. &c.” “ I cannot but  
 “ earnestly recommend it to your most  
 “ serious Consideration; whether the  
 “ new and inconsiderate Notions, you  
 “ have advanced, and (the Arguments, I  
 “ will not say, because, I think, you have

“ not offered any, that are of any real  
 “ Force, but) the Pretences of Reason  
 “ and Authority, which you have put  
 “ into the Hands of sceptical and profane  
 “ Men, to confirm them in their Preju-  
 “ dices against the Belief of the Immor-  
 “ tality of the Soul ; are not likely to  
 “ be of great Disservice to Religion :  
 “ And whether you ought not (as all  
 “ good Men are of Opinion you ought)  
 “ to think of some Means of making  
 “ Satisfaction to the Church, to whom  
 “ you have given so great Offence ; and  
 “ of preventing the Effect of that En-  
 “ couragement, which your Notions in  
 “ this Matter (tho’ nobody doubts but  
 “ it is contrary to your Intention) have  
 “ given to Immorality and Contempt of  
 “ Religion.”

*Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodwell,*

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# O U T L I N E S

O F A N

A N S W E R, &c.

**T**HE learned Dr. *Cudworth*, in his Intellectual System, speaks of Persons (I will not mention the Name he gives them), “ that are possessed with a  
“ certain Kind of Madness, that may be  
“ called *Pneumatophobia*, that makes them  
“ have an irrational, but desperate ab-  
“ horrence from Spirits, or incorporeal  
“ Substances, they being acted also, at  
“ the same Time, with an *Hylomania*,  
“ whereby they madly dote upon Matter,  
“ and devoutly worship it as the only  
“ Numen \*.” A Philosopher, who la-

\* Page 135.

bours under this dreadful Disorder, has lately made an Attack upon the good People of this Country; and it therefore behoves every Man, who thinks he can make up an Antidote to this Poison, to lose no Time in preparing it. Utinam tam facile vera invenire possem, quam falsa convincere! CICER.

Philosophers of all Ages have inferred the *Impenetrability of Matter*, from the Resistance they found in it; but Dr. *Priestley* assures us, that “ if there be  
 “ any Truth in late Discoveries in Philosophy, Resistance is, in most Cases,  
 “ caused by Something of a quite different Nature from any Thing *material*  
 “ or *solid*; viz. by a Power of *Repulsion*  
 “ acting at a Distance from the Body, to  
 “ which it has been supposed to belong;  
 “ and that in no Case can it be proved,  
 “ that



“that Resistance is occasioned by any  
“Thing else \*.”

But admitting the Fact; which in some Cases cannot be denied, I am inclined to think, that *this Power of Repulsion* must be the Power of *Something*—and not an *immaterial* Something; for, according to Dr. *Priestley*, That would be the Power of *Nothing*. But will it follow from this *Something's* being surrounded by a repulsive Power, that if the repulsive Power were withdrawn, Bodies, that might then, without Difficulty, be brought into *actual Contact*, would penetrate each other, and occupy the same Space, that either of them occupied before; and that the Bodies, thus mutually

\* *Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit*, p. 11.

“A Power of Repulsion always acting at a *real*,

“and, in general, an assignable Distance from what

“we call the Body itself.” *Disquisitions*, p. 4.

*penetrating and penetrated*, would have no greater Degree of Solidity and Specific Gravity, than either of them had before this *Penetration*? Let the Parts, of which Bodies are composed, be ever so few, they must, however, occupy some Degree of Space, even when deprived of the Repulsive Power; and it is totally inconceivable, that That identical Space should be occupied by any other Particles, without jostling them out of it. And if no other Particles can occupy that Space, before the absolute Removal of these Particles, it undeniably follows, that these Particles have *an inherent Power of Resistance* clearly distinct from the repulsive Power that surrounds the Matter, of which they are compounded.

The Doctor allows Matter to have *Extension*; that is, Length, Breadth, and Thickness; and from this *Extension*

it plainly follows, that it fills up a Space equal to its Parts, and the repulsive Power that attends them : withdraw the repulsive Power, and force the Particles into Contact, and in this Case, the Space, the Body occupies, will necessarily lessen ; but lessen it with all the Force that can possibly be applied to Matter, and yet, while it continues to have *Extension*, and consequently Parts, not even Annihilation could possibly effect, that other Parts should possess the Space they occupy, at the same Time that they possess it ; for Annihilation could do no more than totally remove those Parts to make Room for others.

Speaking of *Extension*, the Doctor allows, that “ *by Means of it, Matter occupies a certain Portion of Space* \* ;”

\* Disquisitions, page 25.

and while he allows This, he must of Necessity allow, that no other Matter can at the same Time occupy that identical Portion. Suppose, if you please, that all the solid Matter in the Solar System might be contained in a Nutshell, yet this Nutshell must necessarily be *impenetrable*; that is, no fresh Matter, introduced into the System, could possibly be made to occupy the Space of that Nutshell, without annihilating it, or removing it from the Space then occupied by it: And all the Parts, of which this Nutshell of Matter consisted, must be just as *impenetrable* as the whole of it.

When one Body is made to occupy the void Space between the Parts of another Body, it is not only *unphilosophical*, but indeed *ridiculous* to imagine, that these two Bodies have mutually  
*penetrated*

*penetrated* one another \*. Light, which is Matter, passes through transparent Substances, because those Substances have Pores, that suffer it to pass without Interruption: But does it follow, from a Body's having Pores, that it has no Parts? I am truly ashamed of such Philosophy.

It might be safely admitted, that there is not in Nature any such Thing as *absolute Solidity*; that is, that there is no Body; whose Parts cannot be separated by some Force or other; or whose Parts cannot, by proper Force, be made to occupy less Space: But the Separation of the Parts of Bodies by actual Force, or

\* “ By what Criterion can that Person judge of true or false, and why will he refuse his Assent to any Absurdity, that can be proposed to him, who finds no Difficulty in conceiving, *that two Bodies may penetrate one another?* &c.”—Dr. Price's Review of the principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, p. 49.

by a repulsive Power, or the forcing them into a narrower Compass, will never prove, that the Parts of Bodies do not occupy a Space, that cannot at the same Time be occupied by any other Parts.

There is not simply a *Difficulty* in the *Penetrability* of Matter, but an *absolute Impossibility*; and if there were nothing else to be said against the Doctor's System, it would be enough, that he thought *the Penetrability of Matter* necessary to support it. Nescio quomodo nihil tam absurdè dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum †.

“ It

† CICER.

“ Have not some denied any such Thing as  
 “ Motion in the Universe? some made us mere  
 “ Machines; some denied the Existence of all im-  
 “ material Substances; and some again, the Possibi-  
 “ lity of the Existence of Matter itself? I verily  
 “ believe,

“ It will, perhaps, says Dr. Priestley,  
 “ be said, that the Particles, of which  
 “ any solid Atom consists, may be con-  
 “ ceived to be placed close together  
 “ without any mutual Attraction be-  
 “ tween them. But then this Atom  
 “ will be entirely destitute of Compact-  
 “ ness and Hardness, *which is requisite to*  
 “ *its being impenetrable* \*.” I apprehend,  
 that nothing more is requisite to a Bo-  
 dy’s being *impenetrable*, though ever so

“ believe, they have left nothing undenied, that  
 “ can be a Proof of Natural Theology.”

Baxter’s Enquiry into the Nature of the Human  
 Soul, Vol. I. p. 121.

“ Ils veulent être les Inventeurs de quelque Opi-  
 “ nion nouvelle, afin d’acquérir par là quelque Re-  
 “ putation dans le Monde ; & ils s’assurent qu’en  
 “ disant quelque chose qui n’ait point encore été  
 “ dit, ils ne manqueront pas d’Admirateurs.”

Malbranche, Recherche de la Verité, Liv. II. ch. 8.

\* Disquisitions, p. 6,

soft,

soft, than that it should occupy Space ; for whatever does so, can never have its Place occupied by any Thing else, without being removed out of it. The Doctor acknowledges, that “ a Substance may  
 “ be acted upon by one, that is soft,  
 “ which, in fact, is only relatively less  
 “ hard\*.” The Pores of any Substance may be more or less filled by other Matter, and its specific Gravity be increased, or diminished, by that Means ; but it would be grossly absurd to think, that in this Case the same identical Space was occupied by different Parts of Matter. Though Attraction and Repulsion are constant Concomitants of Matter, or, as he calls them, *Powers of Matter*, yet suppose the different Parts of Matter to be held together by any other Powers, and their *Hardness* and *Resistance* might be

\* Disquisitions, p. 61.



just the same it is now: Nay, even the juxta-position of Parts, supposing no Power of any Kind to separate the Particles of Matter, would be sufficient to constitute *Hardness*. At all Events, *Impenetrability* must remain, in every imaginable Circumstance and Situation, so long as the Particles of Matter continue to occupy any Portion of Space.

It is one of the Axioms of Sir Isaac Newton, that every Body will continue in the State of Rest or Motion it is in, unless something produces an Alteration of that State; consequently, if the repulsive Power of Matter were withdrawn, the juxta-position of Parts would still continue.

But Dr. Priestley farther says, that  
 “ no figured Thing can exist, unless the  
 “ Parts, of which it consists, have a  
 “ mutual

“ mutual *Attraction*, so as either to keep  
 “ contiguous to, or to preserve a certain  
 “ Distance from each other \*.” But  
 suppose them once contiguous to each  
 other, and it is the plain Dictate of  
 Common-Sense, as well as of the New-  
 tonian Doctrine, that they must continue  
 to be so, till some Force produces an  
 Alteration of their present State. So  
 that neither Attraction nor Repulsion are  
 absolutely necessary to form *Hardness*,  
*Resistance*, *Solidity*, *Impenetrability*.

Yet he says, that if the Parts of Mat-  
 ter are not held together by *Attraction*  
 or some “ *foreign* Power, every Particle  
 “ would fall from each other, and be  
 “ dispersed †.” But the Truth certainly  
 is, that the Particles must remain just as  
 they now are, if no *foreign* Power is

\* *Disquisitions*, p. 5.

† *Ibid*, p. 6.

introduced to separate and disperse them.  
 If there are such Things as intuitive  
 Truths, This is one.

Still he adds, that “ whatever *Solidity*  
 “ any Body has, it is possessed of only in  
 “ consequence of being endued with  
 “ certain *Powers*; and together with  
 “ this Cause, *Solidity* being no more  
 “ than an Effect, must cease, if there  
 “ be any Foundation for the plainest  
 “ and best-established Rules of reason-  
 “ ing in Philosophy \*.” We have seen  
 above, that this cannot possibly be the  
 Case, if there is any Truth in one of  
 the plainest Axioms of the Newtonian  
 Philosophy. That the plainest and best  
 established Rules of reasoning should be  
 contrary to this Axiom, would be strange  
 indeed !

\* *Disquisitions*, p. 7.

Dr. Priestley supposes Resistance to arise “ from a Power of Repulsion always acting at a Distance from the Body, to which it belongs\*.” He owns, however, that “ a considerable Weight will bring together the Links of a Chain hanging freely in the Air †;” and he will not deny, that there is Resistance, when the repulsive Power is overcome; and he must therefore admit, that the Resistance of Matter is not barely owing to a repulsive Power *acting at a Distance from the Body.*

He says, “ that the component Particles of the hardest Bodies do not actually touch one another, is demonstrable from their being brought nearer together by *Cold*, and by their being removed further from each other by

\* Disquisitions, p. 4 and 11. † Ibid, p. 12.

“ *Heat.*”

“*Heat* \*.” But surely this proves no more, than that *all* the Particles of Body are not in actual Contact; and who ever supposed, that we were acquainted with any Kind of Matter, that was absolutely void of Pores? The Particles are brought together by the Pores becoming less, and they are removed further from each other by the Pores being enlarged.

If Matter should consist only of *Physical Points* †, yet I should still hope, that they would not turn out to be mere *Mathematical Points*. Allow them to be *material*, that is, to have *Length, Breadth,* and *Thicknes*s, and you may reduce their Dimensions, as you please, without affecting my Argument. For, upon the Application of an adequate Force, these *Physical Points* would only approximate upon the

\* *Disquisitions*, p. 13.

† *Ibid*, p. 19.

Removal of the repulsive Power, that keeps them now asunder; and nothing can possibly introduce other *Physical Points* into the identical Place these Points occupy, without removing them out of it. If this is not the Case with Matter, it is self-evident, that there existeth nothing but *Powers*; which, it will be absurd to call the *Powers of Matter*—of a Substance, that occupies Space—because, if these *Physical Points* are not such a Substance, the *Powers* will have nothing to support them.

The Doctor says, that “ the Objection to two Substances being in the same Place, without excluding each other, is only derived from the Resistance, we meet with, to the Touch\*.” But I will take upon me to assert, that

\* Disquisitions, p. 22.

I have one Objection to it, that is derived from quite another Quarter; and that is, that the Business is in rerum naturâ *absolutely impossible*.

Mr. Locke (whose sentiments the Doctor is fond of quoting; whenever they seem to make the least for him) says, that

“ *Solidity*, of all others, seems the Idea  
 “ most intimately connected with and  
 “ essential to Body; so as no where else  
 “ to be found, or imagined, but only in  
 “ Matter; and though our Senses take  
 “ no Notice of it, but in Masses of Mat-  
 “ ter; of a Bulk sufficient to cause a  
 “ Sensation in us; yet the Mind, having  
 “ once got this Idea from such grosser,  
 “ sensible Bodies, traces it farther, and  
 “ considers it, as well as Figure, in the  
 “ minutest Particle of Matter, that can  
 “ exist, and finds it inseparably inherent

“ in body, wherever, or however mo-  
 “ dified \*” “ This is the Idea belongs  
 “ to Body, whereby we conceive it to  
 “ fill Space. The Idea of which filling  
 “ of Space is, that where we imagine  
 “ any Space taken up by a solid Sub-  
 “ stance, we conceive it so to possess it,  
 “ that it excludes all other solid Sub-  
 “ stances, and will for ever hinder any  
 “ two other Bodies, that move towards  
 “ one another in a strait Line, from  
 “ coming to touch one another, unless  
 “ it removes from between them in a  
 “ Line not parallel to That, which they  
 “ move in †.” He says, “ We have the  
 “ Ideas but of three Sorts of Substances ;  
 “ 1. God. 2. Finite Intelligencies. 3. Bo-  
 “ dies ‡.” And that “ though these  
 “ three Sorts of Substances, as we

\* Essay, Book II. Chap. IV. 1.

† Essay, Book II. Chap. IV. 2.

‡ Essay, Book II. Chap. XXVII. 2.



“ term them, do not exclude one ano-  
 “ ther out of the same Place; yet we  
 “ cannot conceive, but that they must  
 “ necessarily each of them exclude any  
 “ of the same Kind out of the same  
 “ Place: or else the Notions and Names  
 “ of *Identity* and *Diversity* would be in  
 “ vain, and there could be no such Dis-  
 “ tinction of Substances, or any Thing  
 “ else, from one another. For Example:  
 “ Could two Bodies be in the same Place  
 “ at the same Time, then those two Par-  
 “ cels of Matter must be one and the  
 “ same, take them great or little; nay,  
 “ all Bodies must be one and the same.  
 “ For by the same Reason, that two  
 “ Particles of Matter may be in one  
 “ Place, all Bodies may be in one Place;  
 “ which, when it may be supposed, takes  
 “ away the Distinction of *Identity* and  
 “ *Diversity*, of one and more, and ren-  
 “ ders it ridiculous.”

Dr. Priestley observes, that Mr. Baxter, though he acknowledged, that *the Powers of Resistance and Cohesion are essential to Matter*, yet thought, that *these Powers are the immediate Agency of the Deity himself*\*;—and This the Doctor is pleased to call “*a strange Opinion*; as, “*in this Case, there is not in Nature* “*any such Thing as Matter, distinct* “*from the Deity and his Operations †.*”

Upon

\* Disquisitions, p. 8.

† “*I admit an intelligent and active Cause in Nature; and have no Objection to supposing, that this intelligent Cause has even more to do in the execution of the Laws of Nature, than Dr. Price is willing to allow.*”—Dr. Priestley’s Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism, &c. p. 8.

“*As to real Agency, a Necessarian can allow of only one proper Seat or Source of it.*”—Ibid. p. 37.

“*As a Necessarian, I, in fact, ascribe every Thing to God, and whether mediately or immediately, makes very little Difference.*”—Ibid. p. 233.

Upon

Upon the Doctor's System, there is not in Nature any such Thing as Matter, distinct from Attraction and Repulsion. "The Supposition of Matter's having *no other Properties, besides those of Attraction and Repulsion*, he

"Upon no System whatever is the great Author of Nature more distinct from his Productions, or his *Presence with them, and Agency upon them*, more necessary."—Ibid. p. 238.

"Strictly speaking, there is but *one Cause, but one sole Agent in universal Nature*."—Ibid. p. 306.

And in another Work Dr. Priestley says, "The Spirit of Devotion must be greatly promoted by the Persuasion, that *God is the proper and sole Cause of all Things*. Upon this Scheme *we see God in every Thing*, and may be said to see every Thing in God; because we continually view every Thing as in *Connexion with him, the Author of it*."

Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity illustrated, being an Appendix to the Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit, p. 108.

I leave it to the very ingenious Doctor to reconcile the *Appendix* and his *Free Discussion*, with the *Disquisitions*.

“ says, (p. 18.) greatly relieves the Diffi-  
 “ culty, &c.” “ The Power of Attrac-  
 “ tion must be essential to the actual  
 “ Existence of all Matter. For every  
 “ Body must have some particular Form ;  
 “ and no Substance can retain a Form  
 “ without Attraction. *Take away At-*  
 “ *traction, which is a Power, and Solidity*  
 “ *itself vanishes \**.”

Which of these two is the *stranger*  
 Opinion, it will be no difficult Matter  
 to determine. For my own Part, I am  
 far from thinking the first a *strange* one ;  
 nor can the Doctor think it so, and be  
 consistent with himself. For he says,  
 “ the Idea, which the Scriptures give us  
 “ of the Divine Nature, is *that of a Be-*  
 “ *ing, properly speaking, every where*  
 “ *present, constantly supporting, and at*

\* Disquisitions, p. 5, 6, 7.

“Pleasure controlling the Laws of Nature \*.” Now, can the Doctor possibly annex any Idea to the Words, *constantly supporting the Laws of Nature*, that will not imply the immediate Agency of the Deity himself? The Doctor justly says, “*He filleth all in all; and He is all in all. In him, saith St. Paul, we live and move, and have our Being †.*” He, who made, and continually supports all Things, must equally attend to all Things at the same Time; “which is a most astonishing and necessary Attribute of the one supreme God ‡.”

God saith, by his Prophet *Isaiab*,  
אנכי יהוה עשה כל גמיה שמים לבדי רקע הארץ  
:מי אתי—Ego sum Dominus, *faciens omnia*,  
*extendens cælos solus, & nullus mecum.*

\* Disquisitions, p. 113.

† Ibid, p. 108.

‡ Ibid, p. 106.

Vulg. \*. *He is not far from any of us.*  
 —*Who quickeneth all Things.*—*By him*  
*all Things consist* †. ΤΙΣ ἢ τῆς κινήσεως  
 ἀρχὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; Δηλον δὲ, ὡςπερ ἘΝ Τῶι  
 ΟΛῶι ΘΕΟΣ, καὶ ΠΑΝ ἘΝ ΕΚΕΙΝῶι.  
 κείναι γὰρ πῶς ΠΑΝΤΑ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῶν·  
 λογὸν γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἔστι λογος, ἀλλὰ τὸ κρείττον· τι  
 ἐν κρείττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης εἶποι, πλὴν ΘΕΟΣ ‡;  
 Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ θεός, ὁ ἐνεργῶν ΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ  
 ἘΝ ΠΑΣΙ §. Ipse humano generi mi-  
 nistrat. Ubique & omnibus præsto est.  
 Quocunque te flexeris, ibi illum videbis  
 occurrendum tibi. *Nihil ab illo vacat,*

\* Chap. xlv. 24.

† Acts xvii. 27. 1 Tim. vi. 13. Colof. i. 17.

‡ Aristot. Moral. Eadem. Lib. vii. c. 14.

§ 1 Cor. xii. 6.

Πολλά εἰπόμεν, καὶ ἔτι μὴ ἐφικώμεθα, καὶ συντε-  
 λεία λόγων ΤΟ ΠΑΝ ἐστὶν αὐτός· Sapient. Sirach.  
 xliii. 29. *Multa dicemus, & deficiemus in verbis:*  
*consummatio autem Sermonum, ipse est in omnibus.*  
 Vulg.

*opus suum ipse implet* \*. *Θαλης ωηθη παντα πληρη θεων ειναι.* † Sunt autem & alii philosophi, & hi quidem magni & nobiles, qui Deorum mente & ratione *Mundum administrari* & regi sentiunt; neque vero id solum, sed etiam ab iisdem vitæ hominum consuli & provideri; nam et fruges, & reliqua, que terra pariat, & tempestates, ac temporum varietates, cælique mutationes, quibus omnia, quæ terra gignat, maturata pubescant, a *Diis immortalibus tribui humano generi putant* ‡. See Dr. Price's Essay on Providence, p. 29, &c. and Bp. Berkley's Siris, Sect. 237.

\* Senec. de Benef. Lib. iv. 8. Quid aliud est Natura, quam Deus, & divina Ratio toti mundo inserta. Ibid. cap. 7.

† Aristot. de Animâ, Lib. i. cap. 5.

‡ Cicer. de Naturâ Deor. Lib. i.

Ver quæ declaratur haud dubiè Naturæ potentia, idque esse quod Deum vocamus.—Plin. Nat. Histor. Lib. ii. 7.

*The Powers of Attraction and Repulsion,* Dr. Priestley tells us, *are necessary to the very Being of Matter.* But, I apprehend, the utmost a cautious Reasoner will take upon him to assert, is, that these Powers *seem* necessary to Matter, as it now appears to us. I say, *seem*; because I think, that all the Phænomena of the material World prove, is the probable *Conjunction* of Extension, Attraction, and Repulsion; but that they by no Means prove their *necessary Connection.* *Attraction* and *Repulsion* are Terms that Philosophers have, for some Time, made use of in accounting for certain Facts before them. It has been the Fashion of the Times to make use of these Terms. The next Age may possibly invent others. It is certain, that Sir Isaac Newton thought it not impossible, that all the Phænomena, we now account for by Attraction and Repulsion, might be accounted for



in another Way. Dr. Priestley asserts, that the Particles of all Bodies are held together *by the Powers of Attraction and Repulsion* \*; but Dr. Leslie is inclined to think, that the grand Cementer of the Particles of Matter is not *a mere Power* (an occult Quality !) but *Phlogiston*. For “all Nature bears Testimony not only

\* “ Dr. Hales was of opinion, that *Air*, in its  
 “ fixed and inert State, gives *Union, Weight,* and  
 “ *Firmness*, to all natural Bodies. By his Experi-  
 “ ments we are informed, that fixed Air constitutes  
 “ *near one Third Part* of the solid Contents of the  
 “ Heart of Oak. It is found to bear near the same  
 “ Proportion in Peas, Beans, and other Vegetable  
 “ Substances. Heat and Fermentation render it  
 “ elastic. It is again capable of being absorbed and  
 “ fixed. Was the whole Air of the Universe brought  
 “ at once into an elastic, repulsive State, every Thing  
 “ would suffer a sudden Dissolution. Was it intirely  
 “ fixed, then all Things would be reduced to an  
 inert Lump. *Almighty Providence has provided* against  
 “ these Extremes, and in the most wonderful Man-  
 “ ner *preserves* the Balance.”—Dr. Hunter’s Geor-  
 gical Essays, p. 84.

“ to

“ to the Existence of the *phlogistic Fluid*,  
 “ but likewise to its incessant, active  
 “ energy. It appears, from innumer-  
 “ able Phænomena, to pervade all Na-  
 “ ture, and by its various Modifications  
 “ to constitute the peculiar distinguish-  
 “ ing Properties of Bodies; Light and  
 “ Fire consist in it; and whatever In-  
 “ fluence they have in generating and  
 “ supporting Animal and Vegetable Life,  
 “ is solely to be ascribed to it. It is to  
 “ the *Ethereal Fluid*, that *Metals* owe  
 “ their *Splendour*, *Ductility*, and *Elasti-*  
 “ *city*; *Magnets* their *Polarity*, and all  
 “ Bodies their *Electricity*.” “ It is easier  
 “ to conceive, that one Agent should  
 “ produce many Effects, than that many  
 “ Agents should, without Confusion,  
 “ exert at the same Time, and on the  
 “ same Body, their respective Powers, as  
 “ of *Electricity*, *Gravity*, *Magnetism*,  
 “ *Elasticity*, &c. Besides, have we not  
 “ innu-

“ innumerable Instances in the History  
 “ of Nature, of the same Agent produc-  
 “ ing various Effects? Doth not *Fire*  
 “ excite *Heat*, cause *Light*, *Extension*,  
 “ *Elasticity*? Doth not the *Electric*  
 “ *Fluid* produce the Effects of *Attrac-*  
 “ *tion*, *Repulsion*, *Magnetism*, &c.? \*”  
 Let us then hear no more of *the Powers*  
*of Attraction and Repulsion*; Powers, the  
 Absence of which annihilates the very  
 Substance, to which they belong! It is

\* Philosophical Enquiry into the Cause of Animal Heat, p. 270, 1, 3, 4.

“ Magnetism and Electricity are not new Quali-  
 “ ties, resulting from different and unknown Powers,  
 “ but merely Emissions of certain Streams of Mat-  
 “ ter, which produce certain, determinate Motions.”  
 Dr. Clarke’s Second Defence of his Letter to Mr.  
 Dodwell.

“ Electricity, as it is one of the most powerful, is  
 “ also one of the most important Agents in Nature.”  
 Mr. Henley in Phil. Trans. 1777, Part I. p. 97, &c.  
 See Bp. Berkeley’s *Siris*, Sect. 189, 190.

Matter in Motion, that Causes the Phæ-  
 nomena of Attraction and Repulsion ;  
 and this Motion can only be produced  
 and continued by the great First Cause,  
 who, as Dr. Priestley justly observes, *con-*  
*stantly supports the Laws of Nature.* Νῦν  
 μὲν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως \*. Νῦν δὲ ἀδυνατόν τὸ  
 ἀκίνητον ὑπο ἀκίνητον κινεῖσθαι ποῦθεν ἐν τῷ  
 σώματι τὸ κινεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀπο τῆς ψυχῆς ;  
 ἔτι γὰρ αὐτοκίνητον ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα †. Ἡ δὲ ὕλη,  
 ἢ ὕλη, παθητικόν ‡. Τῆς μὲν ὕλης τὸ πασχεῖν  
 ἐστὶ καὶ κινεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ κινεῖν, καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν,  
 ἑτέρας δυνάμεως §.

\* “ Anaxagoras, apud Diog. Laert.

Πλὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ τὸν Νῦν τιθεῖται (Ἀναξαγόρας)  
 μάλιστα πάντων. Μόνον γὰρ φησὶν αὐτὸν τῶν ἐντῶν  
 ἀπλῶν εἶναι, καὶ ἀμιγῆτε, καὶ καθαρὸν ἀποδί-  
 δῶσι δ' ἀμφὸς τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, τότε γινώσκειν, καὶ  
 τὸ κινεῖν, λέγων Νῦν κινῆσαι τόπαν. — Aristot. de  
 Anima, Lib. I. Cap. 2.

† Nemesius, de Naturâ Hominis, p. 69.

‡ Aristot. de Generatione & Corruptione, Lib. I.  
 cap. 7.

§ Aristot. de Gen. & Corrupt. Lib. II. cap. 9.

The Newtonian Rule, not to admit more Causes of Things, than are sufficient to explain Appearances—is what I am very willing to abide by in considering this Subject; and yet, while *Extension* makes any Part of the Definition of Matter, I shall, I apprehend, find myself under a Necessity of looking farther than the material System, in order to account for that *Consciousness*, I possess; which being ONE, I cannot but pronounce, that the Substance, to which it belongs, *is not extended* \*. Dr. Priestley says, that “those who have written about Consciousness, have given him no clear Idea of the Subject †.” For my own Part, I think, nothing can be clearer

\* “Consciousness signifies the reflex Act, by which I know, that I *think*, and that my Thoughts and Actions are *my own* and *not another’s*.”—Dr. Clarke’s Second Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell.

† Disquisitions, p. 86.

than

than what Dr. Clarke has written on this Subject, in his Letter to Mr. Dodwell\*, and at the Conclusion of his Second Defence of that Letter †. If Thought arises from the Vibration of a certain System of Matter, then every Particle of that vibrating System must have

\* Edit. 8vo. p. 246.

† “ If Souls be *extended Substances*, consisting of  
 “ mere Points, one without another, all concurring  
 “ in every Sensation; then must every one of those  
 “ Points either perceive a *Point* and *Part* of the Ob-  
 “ ject only, or else the *Whole*. Now, if every *Point*  
 “ of the extended Soul perceive only a *Point* of the  
 “ Object, then is there no one Thing in us, that  
 “ perceives the *Whole*, or which can compare one  
 “ Part with another. But if every Point of the  
 “ extended Soul perceive the *whole* Object at once,  
 “ consisting of many Parts, then would there be in-  
 “ numerable *Perceptions* of the same Object in every  
 “ Sensation; as many, as there are *Points* in the  
 “ extended Soul. And from both those Suppositions  
 “ it would alike follow, that no Man is *one single*  
 “ *Percipient* or *Person*, but that there are innumer-  
 “ able *distinct Percipients* and *Persons* in every Man.”  
 Dr. Cudworth’s Intellectual System, p. 826.

a *distinct*

a *distinct Consciousness* ; for every Particle of that System is *distinct*, and the Vibration of the whole System is nothing more than the Sum of the Vibrations of its distinct Parts. The whole cannot contain more than its Parts ; and therefore, if the Parts of a vibrating System have not distinct Cogitation (which must be self-evident to every man, who reflects upon his *Consciousness* and *Individuality*) neither can Thought arise from the Vibration of the whole System. “ The  
 “ Power of the Whole, being but the  
 “ Sum or Mixture of the Powers of the  
 “ Parts, cannot possibly be of a different  
 “ Kind or Species from all the several  
 “ Powers of the Parts ; thinking is, of  
 “ of Necessity, specifically different from  
 “ all and every one of the Powers,  
 “ known or unknown, of Particles,

D

“ which

“ which are confessed to be void of  
 “ Thought \*.”

A System of Matter, according to Dr. Priestley, has *the Powers of Attraction and Repulsion*; and so has every Particle, of which that System is compounded. And the Case cannot but be the same with a System of Matter, that has a *per-  
 cipient, or sentient Power*. “ Residing  
 “ in the whole, and not residing in the  
 “ Parts, is residing, and not residing in  
 “ it, at the same Time †.” “ Un-  
 “ thinking Particles of Matter, however  
 “ put together, can have nothing thereby  
 “ added to them, but a new Relation of  
 “ Position, which, ’tis impossible, should

\* Dr. Clarke’s Second Defence, p. 106.

Αναγκη αρα, επει παντα νοει, αμιγη ειναι, ωσπερ  
 φησιν Αναξαγορας, ινα κρατη’ τειτο δ’ εινι, ινα  
 γνωριζη.—Aristot. de Animâ, Lib. III. cap. 4.

† Dr. Clarke’s Second Defence, p. 123.



“ give Thought and Knowledge to  
 “ them \*.”

*A percipient, sentient Power, super-*  
 added to a vibrating System, made up of  
 unthinking Parts, must either result from  
 the whole vibrating System, without re-  
 siding in its several Parts; which is ab-  
 surd; or it is a Quality or Power sub-  
 sisting without a Substance; which is, if  
 possible, still more absurd. If it cannot  
 be the Power of the several Parts of the  
 vibrating System, which Parts, it is ad-  
 mitted, are without Thought, it must  
 necessarily be the Faculty of a distinct  
 Substance †.

Dr.

\* Locke's Essay, Book IV. Chap. X. 15.

† “ Parts of any Substance must be of the same  
 “ Substance by the Terms, and of the same Nature  
 “ with the Whole, of which they are Parts; differ-  
 “ ing only from the Whole in more or less, but not  
 “ in Nature and fundamental Properties; otherwise

Dr. Priestley is pleased to say \*, “ If  
 “ one Kind of Substance be capable of  
 “ supporting all the known Properties  
 “ of Man ; that is, if these Properties  
 “ have nothing in them, that is abso-  
 “ lutely incompatible with one another,  
 “ we shall be obliged to conclude, that  
 “ no other Kind of Substance enters into  
 “ his Composition.”

The Doctor will not, I presume, deny  
 that the separate Particles of Matter, of

“ the Substance of these Parts would not be the same  
 “ with that of the Whole ; or they would be Parts  
 “ of the same Substance, and not of the same Sub-  
 “ stance, which is contradictory.”—Baxter’s En-  
 quiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, p. 232.  
 See also p. 234, 5, 6, 7.

Mr. Locke, who is often quoted by Infidel Writers  
 on this Subject, expressly says, that “ the more pro-  
 “ bable Opinion is, that *Consciousness is annexed to*  
 “ *the Affection of an individual, immaterial Substance.*”  
 —Essay, Book II. Chap. XXVII. 25.

\* Disquisitions, p. 25.

which a vibrating System is compounded, are devoid of Thought ; or indeed, that a vibrating, material System cannot be made up of any other Particles ; and it has been, I think, demonstrated, that no possible Organization of these Particles can produce an *individual, conscious Being*. It is not, in Fact, conceivable, that an individual, percipient Power should be superadded to a material System ; and to say, that the Divine Being can, if He pleases, superadd such a Power, is to say, that He can make a Substance to be Matter, and not Matter, at the same Time ; which is one of those Things one may assert, without the least Impiety, to be impossible to God himself \*. We have not, therefore, in Matter a *Substance capable*

\* “ It is perfectly absurd to say, infinite Power may superadd a Property to a Substance *incapable of receiving it.*” — Baxter’s Enquiry, &c. Vol. I. p. 370.

capable of supporting all the known Properties of Man. For, whatever consists of separate, distinct Parts, we have seen is incompatible with Thought. *Dividuality and Individuality* cannot possibly belong to one and the same Substance.

The Doctor says, “ we have no *proper* Idea of any Essence whatsoever †.”

“ To assign *the Power of God*, instead of a natural Reason, or to fly to *the Power of God* against clear Reason, appear to me equally unphilosophical. And indeed, considering that we can take our Measure of Things only by those Ideas which we have of them, if after we have duly compared those Ideas, and determined of the Natures and Differences of Things according to them, it shall be thought a sufficient Answer to have Recourse to *the Power of God*, then we shall never be able to know how to judge of any Thing, or when we have concluded any Thing. And *Transubstantiation itself may be good sound Doctrine, notwithstanding all that Philosophy shall demonstrate to the contrary, from the Idea we have of Body.*” —Norris’s Theory of the Ideal World, Vol. II. p. 48.

† Disquisitions, p. 104.

But if we have an Idea of the *Properties* of any Essence or Substance, we have, I apprehend, a *proper* Idea of it ; for we have all the Idea it is possible we should have. The internal Constitution, from which the Powers or Properties of any Substance flow, it must be confessed is, and perhaps for ever will be, out of our Reach \*. However, we know well enough,

\* “ Les Philosophes tombent assez d'accord,  
 “ qu'on doit regarder comme *l'Essence d'une Chose* ce  
 “ que l'on reconnoit de premier dans cette chose, ce  
 “ qui en est inseparable, & d'ou dépendent toutes les  
 “ proprieté qui lui conviennent, ou qui sont ren-  
 “ fermées dans l'Idée qu'on en a ; comme *la Dureté,*  
 “ *la Mollesse, la Fluidité, le Mouvement, le Repos, la*  
 “ *Figure, la Divisibilité, l'Impénétrabilité, & l'Etendue,*  
 “ & considerer d'abord lequel de tous ses Attributs  
 “ en est inseparable. Ainsi *la Fluidité, la Dureté, la*  
 “ *Mollesse, la Mouvement, & le Repos,* se pouvant se-  
 “ parer de *la Matière,* puisque il y a plusieurs Corps  
 “ qui sont sans *Dureté,* ou sans *Fluidité,* ou sans  
 “ *Mollesse,* qui ne sont point en *Mouvement,* ou en-  
 “ fin qui ne sont point en *repos* ; il s'ensuit claire-

enough, that a Substance, which has Powers and Properties incompatible with those of another Substance, must be a different Substance. It is from their Properties, that we know Substances. Indeed the Word, *Property*, is relative, and implies Substance. It is by their Properties that we distinguish Substances from one another. We call *Gold* a material Substance ; and we say, that *Silver*

“ ment, que tout ces Attributs ne lui sont point *Esf-*  
 “ *fentiels*. Mais il en reste quatre, que nous conce-  
 “ vons inseparables de la matière ; sçavoir la *Figure*,  
 “ la *Divisibilité*, l'*Impénétrabilité*, & l'*Etendue*. De  
 “ sorte que pourvoir quel est l'Attribut qu'on doit  
 “ prendre pour l'*Essence*, il ne faut plus songer à les  
 “ séparer, mais seulement examiner, lequel est le  
 “ premier, & qui n'en suppose point d'autre. On  
 “ reconnoit facilement, que la *Figure*, la *Divisibilité*,  
 “ & l'*Impénétrabilité*, suppose l'*Etendue*, & que l'*Eten-*  
 “ *due* ne suppose rien ; mais dès qu'elle est donnée,  
 “ la *Divisibilité*, l'*Impénétrabilité*, & la *Figure* sont  
 “ données. Ainsi on doit conclure, que l'*Eten-*  
 “ *due est l'Essence de la Matière*.”—Malbranche, Re-  
 cherche de la Verité, Liv. III. Chap. 8.

differs

differs from *Gold* in *Colour* and *specific Gravity*; but we still include it in the Class of *material Substances*; because it has many Things in common with *Gold*, and other Metals; as *Extension*, *Figure*, *Fusibility*, and *Impenetrability*. But if it had no one Property essential to *Gold* or other material Substance, we should justly conclude it to be absolutely of a different Nature. And this is the Case with Mind. *Sensation*, *Thought*, *Memory*, *Volition*! What have they similar to *Solidity*, *Extension*, *Figure*? Can there be such a Thing as indivisible Matter? Or such a Thing as divisible *Sensation*, *Thought*, *Volition*? There is but one Thing, that Mind and Matter can be conceived to have in common; and that is *Motion*. But here again the Difference is immense; for a Capability of being moved *ab extra*, has not even the most distant Similarity to the Power of moving ourselves or

3

other

other Things. Mind has the Power of Motion in itself; which, if we know any Thing, we are certain, is not the Case with Matter\*.

We

\* *Differentiæ* vero mutuâ oppositione se invicem illustrant; ita ut impossibile sit ut quis intelligat, quid sit *materialis substantia* quin eo ipso statim intelligat, quid sit *substantia immaterialis*; aut quid sit vitam motumve *ex se non habere*, quin continuo percipiat quid sit utraque *in se habere, vel communicare posse aliis*.—Mori Enchirid. Metaphysic. p. 380.

Λειπεται δ'ε του νου μονον θυραθεν επεισιεναι, καιθειον ειναι μονον\* εδ'ε γαρ αυτε τη ενεργεια κοιωνει σωματικη ενεργεια.—Aristot. de Generat. Animal. Lib. II. Cap. 3.

Το μεν αισθητικον εκ ανευ σωματος\* ο δε Νους χωριστος.—Aristot. de Animâ, Lib. III. Cap. 4.

Ο δε Νους ειικεν εγγινεσθαι, εσια τις εσα, και εφθειρεσθαι.—Ibid. Lib. I. Cap. 4.

Ο δε Νους ισωςθειοτερον τι και απαθες εσιν.—Ibid.

Και ετος ο Νους χωριστος, και αμιγης, και απαθης τη εσια, ων ενεργεια\* αι γαρ τιμιωτερον το παιεν τε πασχοντος, και η αρχη της υλης.—

Χρισθεις



We have no Idea of Substances but from their *Properties*; but we cannot but be convinced, that all Properties must have a Substance suited to them to inhere in. We suppose such a Substance for *Solidity, Extension, Divisibility*; which we term *Matter*: And must we not conclude, that there is a Substance equally proper for *Sensation, Thought, Recollection, Volition*? But though we know nothing of Substances, but from their Properties, or rather the Effect these Properties have on us; will it follow, that Properties, so essentially different, are not the Properties of distinct Substances? Just reasoning will certainly lead us to

Χωρισθεῖς δὲ εἰσι μόνον τὰς δ' ὅπερ εἰσι, καὶ τὰ το  
 μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίον. — Ibid. Lib. II.  
 Cap. 5.

Εἰκε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι· καὶ τὰ το μόνον  
 ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ το αἰδίον τὰ  
 φθαρτὰ. — Ibid. Lib. II. Cap. 2.

the direct contrary Conclusion. Speaking of the Divine Nature the Doctor frankly acknowledges, that “the Properties or Powers being different, the Substance or Essence must be different also \*.”

As “many of the Objects of our Ideas are divisible,” Dr. Priestley is confident to say, “it necessarily follows, that the Ideas themselves are divisible also †.” He instances in the Idea of a *Man*, of his *Head, Arms, Trunk, Legs, &c.* But this is a mere Sophism. The Idea of a *Leg* is not Part of an Idea; it is as compleat an Idea of itself, as the Idea of *Man* is. The Idea of *one* is ONE Idea; the Idea of a Million is no more.

Yet Dr. Priestley says, “Ideas, which have Parts, as most of our Ideas

\* *Disquisitions*, p. 167.

† *Ibid.* p. 37.

“ manifestly have, cannot exist in a Soul,  
 “ that has no Parts \*.” I have the Idea  
 of a Cord, which consists of many  
 Threads; I can, in Imagination, untwist  
 this Cord, and by so doing have several  
 distinct Ideas; but one of these Threads  
 is not a Part of an Idea, but as compleat  
 an Idea as that of the Cord is. The Idea  
 of every Substance is complex; it is a  
 Combination of many simple Ideas. Let  
 us instance in the *Sun*. I can, at plea-  
 sure, analyse this Idea into *Heat*, *Bright-  
 ness*, *Roundness*, &c. &c. Yet my Idea  
 of the Sun is but *one* Idea. And my be-  
 ing able to resolve this Idea into all the  
 simple Ideas, of which it is an Aggregate,  
 no more proves the Mind, that does This,  
 to be made of Parts, than my being able  
 to form the Ideas of *Heat*, *Brightness*,  
 and *Roundness*, on any other Occasion,  
 does. “ As simple Ideas are observed to

\* *Disquisitions*, p. 102.

“ exist in several Combinations; united  
 “ together; so the Mind has a Power  
 “ to consider several of them united to-  
 “ gether, as one Idea \*.” “ We can  
 “ not only conceive *Extension* without  
 “ *Cogitation*, and again *Cogitation* with-  
 “ out *Extension*; from whence may be  
 “ inferred, that they are Entities really  
 “ distinct, and separable from one ano-  
 “ ther (we having no other Rule to  
 “ judge of the real Distinction and Se-  
 “ parability of Things than from our  
 “ Conceptions) but also are not able to  
 “ conceive *Cogitation* with *Extension*.  
 “ We cannot conceive a *Thought* to be  
 “ of such a certain *Length*, *Breadth*, and  
 “ *Thicknes*s, measurable by Inches and  
 “ Feet, and by solid Measures. We  
 “ cannot conceive *Half*, or a *Third Part*,  
 “ or a *Twentieth Part* of a Thought,  
 “ much less of the Thought of an in-

\* Locke's Essay, Book II. Chap. XII. 1.

“ divisible Thing ; neither can we con-  
 “ ceive every Thought to be of some  
 “ certain, determinate Figure, either  
 “ *round or angular ; spherical, cubical, or*  
 “ *cylindrical ; or the like \*.*”

But the Doctor still urges, “ if the  
 “ Archetypes of our Ideas have Exten-  
 “ sion, the Ideas must have it likewise ;  
 “ and therefore the Mind, whether ma-  
 “ terial or immaterial, must have Exten-  
 “ sion also †.” If it were true, that a  
 sentient Substance, extended or non-  
 extended, could not have an Idea dissi-  
 milar to itself, as to Extension or Non-  
 Extension, the Ideas of such a Substance  
 would be few indeed ! In the Idea of  
 Extension, I have only the Idea of the  
 Parts of Matter in a State of Contiguity.  
 Let the Expansion of Space, occupied

\* Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System, p. 828.

† Disquisitions, p. 38.

by this Matter, be ever so large, the Idea of it is but *one* Idea. The Idea of *Extension* is the Mind's Conclusion from its Sensations and Perceptions. Upon touching the Table, on which I write, I have the Idea of *Resistance*: When I lay my Hand on the Table, I perceive it is not a single Particle of Matter that resists, but many Particles closely united. By the Addition of those Particles to that I first touched, the Mind concludes, that the Body, in which those Particles are united, is *extended*. Is it necessary, that the sentient Substance should be extended, to form an Idea of the Juxtaposition of the Parts of which Bodies are composed? If I place a Ball between my Hands, I have no Sensation but that of *Resistance*; yet the Mind unavoidably concludes, that the two Sides of the Ball are at a Distance from one another, and that the Matter of it is *extended*.

As to *visible Extension*, be it observed, that though there is an Image formed on the *Retina*, that has generally some Resemblance of the Object, yet it is not so much as pretended, that there is any such Image in the *Optic Nerve*, or in the *Brain*. It is an undoubted Truth, that Persons, born blind, may have an Idea of *Extension*; but the *Touch*, from which they derived this Idea, gave them nothing but the Sensation of *Hardness* and *Resistance*, which has not the least Resemblance to *Extension* \*. *An extended*

\* “ Some Ideas are found accompanying the most  
 “ different Sensations, which yet are not to be per-  
 “ ceived separately from some sensible Quality; such  
 “ are *Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest*, which  
 “ accompany *the Ideas of Sight or Colours*, and yet  
 “ may be perceived without them, as in the Ideas of  
 “ *Touch*, at least if we move our Organs along the  
 “ Parts of the Body touched. *Extension, Figure,*  
 “ *Motion, or Rest*, seem therefore to be more pro-  
 “ perly called Ideas accompanying the Sensations of

*tended Image* is indeed painted on the Bottom of the Eye ; but the Case, I have just mentioned, proves, that the Sight of this Image is not necessary to the acquiring the Idea of *Extension*. And indeed, if it were necessary, it is most certain, that we should never have the Idea ; for it is acknowledged, that the Mind does not see it there. The seat of the sentient Power the Doctor admits

“ *Sight and Touch*, than the Sensations of either of those Senses.”—Hutcheson’s *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, Sect. I.

“ It is true, we have Feelings of *Touch*, which every Moment present *Extension* to the Mind ; but how they come to do so is the Question ; for these Feelings do no more resemble *Extension*, than they resemble Justice or Courage ; nor can the Existence of extended Things be inferred from these Feelings by any Rules of Reasoning.”—Reid on Human Mind, p. 134.

“ There is here a Feeling and a Conclusion drawn from it, *or* some Way suggested by it.”——Ibid, p. 136.

See also Locke’s *Essay*, Book I. Chap. IX. 9.



to be in *the Brain*, and no one has ever supposed, that any Image is painted in the Brain. The whole Business, according to Dr. Priestley, is performed by *Vibrations*; and a Vibration can be no more than a Vibration, let the Object, that made the Impression, which excited this Vibration, be *extended*, or *non-extended*.

How often must it be proved, that *Sensations* and *Ideas* have *no Resemblance* of the Substances, that are the Occasions of their being suggested to us? I shall as soon believe, that the percipient Power within one is *a black Cat*, because I have at this Instant the Idea of one, that sits at my Elbow, as that this Power is *extended*, because I have the Idea of *Extension*.

*An extended, percipient Power!* What wonderful Things has modern Philoso-

phy produced ! “ An *extended Soul* seems just such another Phrase as a *green Sound*, an *Ell of Consciousness*, a *Cube of Virtue* \*.” “ These Qualities (Extension and Figure) are in the Mind only as they are perceived by it, that is, not by Way of *Mode* or *Attribute*, but by Way of *Idea* ; and it no more follows, that the Soul or Mind is *extended*, because Extension exists in it alone, than it does, that it is *red* or *blue*, because these Colours are on all Hands acknowledged to exist in it, and no where else †.” I trust, that my quoting this Passage will not lead any one, who shall chance to read these Papers, to suspect, that I believe *Extension to exist in the Mind alone*.

\* Bp. Law's Notes to Archbishop King's Origin of Evil, p. 34.

† Bp. Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. 49.

The sentient Power, *extended or not*, has Ideas, that are *not extended*; for it has Ideas of *Hardness, Softness, Attraction, Repulsion, Motion, Rest, &c. &c.*; which, though Affections of Matter, certainly stand clear of all Extension. And is there not just as much Difficulty in conceiving, that an *extended* percipient Power should have Ideas *without Extension*, as that an *unextended* percipient Substance should have the Idea of *Extension*? If an *extended*, percipient Power may have Ideas, that have no natural Connection with *Extension*, it seems but reasonable to admit the Possibility, that an *unextended*, intelligent Substance may have Ideas, that have no natural Connection with *Non-Extension*. If the Soul must be *extended*, merely because it has the Idea of *Extension*, it seems a necessary Conclusion, that its *Extension* must be proportioned to that of the *extended*

Body, of which it has an Idea; and therefore, as my Mind takes in perfectly the Idea of a Field, which is now before my Eyes, and which, I apprehend, contains about forty Acres, it should follow, that my Mind has the Length and Breadth of forty Acres. In a Moment my Mind forms the Idea of a Pin's Point; and it should follow likewise, that its Dimensions are instantaneously reduced to the Size of the Point of a Pin\*. If the *Mind* must be *extended*,  
because

\* "Were That, which perceiveth in us, a *Magnitude*, then could it not be *ισον παντι αισθητω*,  
" *equal to every sensible*, and alike *perceive both lesser*  
" *and greater Magnitude* than itself; but least of all  
" could it perceive such Things as have *no Magni-*  
" *tude* at all."—Dr. Cudworth's *Intellectual System*, p. 827.

Ουδ' ἡ αισθησις μεγεθος εστιν, αλλα λογος τις  
και δυναμις εκεινυ. Aristot. de Animâ, Lib. II.  
Cap. XII.

"The Soul conceives extended Things themselves,  
" *unextendedly* and *indivisibly*; for as the Distance  
" of

because the *Ideas* are, and the *Ideas* must be *extended*, because the *Archetypes* are so; it can only be, because the *Mind*, the *Ideas*, and the *Archetypes* must be exactly similar; and this Similarity must extend to Size as well as Figure.

“ of a whole *Hemisphere* is contracted into a narrow  
 “ *Compass* in the *Pupil* of the *Eye*, so are all the  
 “ *Distances* yet more contracted in the *Soul* itself,  
 “ and there understood *indistinctly*. For the *Thought*  
 “ of a *Mile’s Distance*, or of *ten Thousand Miles*,  
 “ or *Semidiameters* of the *Earth*, takes up no more  
 “ *Room* in the *Soul*, nor stretches it any more,  
 “ than does the *Thought* of a *Foot* or an *Inch*, or  
 “ indeed of a *Mathematical Point*.”—Dr. Cudworth,  
 in the *Place* quoted above.

“ *Quis quæso unquam concepit mediam, aut*  
 “ *quartam partem animæ? An magnas animas plus*  
 “ *spatii quam parvas occupare videmus, spiritusque*  
 “ *noſter, cum multa concipimus, num grandior ſit*  
 “ *mole, quam cum pauciora intelligimus?*” *Tractat.*  
*de Mente humanâ (Autore Ludovic. de la Forge,*  
*Medicinæ apud Salmuriensēs Doctore) Cap. V.*  
*Amſtelodami apud Dan. Elzevir, 1669.*

There was something like the Appearance of Argument in this Way of Reasoning, (though indeed there was nothing but the Appearance) while Philosophy rested itself on the Images of visible Objects painted on the Retina; but, upon *the System of Vibrations*, the poor Appearance of Reasoning vanishes. For what Resemblance has a *Vibration* to *Extension*? If you perceive any such; then I ask, what Resemblance has a *Vibration* to *Sensation*? Are Sensations *extended*? Can *Vibrations* equally well resemble *Extension* and *Non-Extension*? The *Brain*, which is *extended*, vibrates in Consequence of an Impression, that produced an *unextended Sensation*; it vibrates, differently it may be supposed, in Consequence of an Impression made by an *extended Object*; but it is not the extended, vibrating Brain, that perceives, according to Dr. Priestley, but a *perci-*

*perceptient Power superadded to this vibrating Brain.* I will not say, it is ridiculous to talk of *an extended Power*; no! let it be Philosophy to do so. But sure, I may be permitted to ask, where is the Necessity of *the Power's being extended*, when the Business only is to judge of the different Vibrations of the Brain, that affect it; all which, as it seems, this imaginary, superadded, perceptient Power may do full as well *without Extension*, as with it.

Dr. Priestley, having told us, that “ it is supposed, that the Brain, besides its vibratory Power, hath *superadded to it a perceptient, or sentient Power likewise,*” adds, “ there is no Reason, that we know of, why this Power might not be imparted to it \*.” But as a *vibratory Power* will communicate

\* Disquisitions, page 91.

nothing but *Vibrations*; and he assures us, that “*the Brain itself is the percipient Power, as well as the Subject of these Vibrations\**,” it cannot but seem something strange, that the *Brain* should *vibrate* in order to inform itself of what passes within itself; and that it should get Information of any Thing by *Vibrations*, but of *the Vibrations themselves*. And all this will appear yet more strange, when we consider, that, according to the Doctor, though *the Vibrations of the Brain produce Ideas, and the Brain is the percipient Power, as well as the Subject of these Vibrations*; yet, “it is easy to form an Idea of there being *Vibrations* without any *Perceptions* accompanying them;”—that the Motion of the percipient System produces *Perception*, and yet the percipient System may be in Motion *without any*

\* *Disquisitions*, p. 90.



*Perception!* \*. We see every Thing is done which the Doctor thinks necessary, to generate a *Sensation, or an Idea*. An *Impression* must produce a *Vibration*; for the *Brain* is *Matter*, and must vibrate *under an Impression*; and the acknowledged Business of a *Vibration* is to produce *Perception*. It cannot be said, that the percipient Power is absent; for the Doctor assures us, that the *Brain* is the percipient Power, as well as the Subject of these *Vibrations*. There may still, however, be no *Perception*. What is the Cause? Has the percipient Power some

\* Dr. Priestley says, "Whatever may be the Effect of any Sensation or Idea upon the Brain, the Impression may be so strong as to overpower all other Impressions." (p. 100.) That is, in a few Words, the Brain, when labouring under one *Vibration*, is incapable of having another at the same Time; or if it is vibrated, the percipient Power cannot take in more than one *Vibration* at a Time. Compare this with the Passage quoted below from the 90th Page of the Doctor's Work.

other

other Object, that takes up its Attention? That cannot be the Case; for the Doctor assures us, that “the Brain must feel the Effect of every particular Impression made upon it\*.” Besides, the percipient Power is conscious of nothing without Vibrations. We want to account for the Brain’s not perceiving, when it has Vibrations. And the Impossibility of doing this, upon the Doctor’s System, is a plain Proof, that his System is ill founded; and that the Author of Nature has not superadded to the vibratory Power of the Brain, a percipient and sentient Power so ill fitted for the Business, that it is, upon this Hypothesis, impossible to account for one of the most common Phænomena in Nature. Lodge *an immaterial, intelligent Substance in the Brain*, and this Difficulty vanishes. The Mind never

\* Disquisitions, p. 90.

fails to attend to the Impressions made on the Organs of Sense, if she is not occupied with her own Ideas; and even when she is thus engaged, her Attention is to be recalled by a strong Impression.

That *Motion* cannot produce *Thought*, is strictly demonstrable; for *Motion* is *successive*, both as to *Place* and *Time*, being from Point to Point. Let the Point *A* be the *terminus a quo*; the Point *B* the *terminus ad quem*; but when Matter is in *A*, it is not in *Motion*; and therefore can have no Pretension to the Power of producing *Thought*; for *Motion* is then *in futuro*; and when the Matter has arrived at *B*, the *Motion* from *A* to *B* is *past*. And is it possible, that *Motion* should produce *Thought*, which is *individual*, when no Points of it are, even in Imagination, *co-existent*, either as to *Place* or *Time*? Subdivide the *Time*

and

and the *Space* as long as you please, and the Impossibility of the *Co-existence* of *Motion* in any two Points, will be equally self-evident.

The only Idea we have, or can have, of *Matter* in *Motion*, is, that it changes *Place*; that is, that it is successively united to different Parts of *Space*. And if this be, as, I am persuaded, it is, the whole of the Business, we have a fresh Demonstration, that *Thought* cannot arise from the *Motion* of *Matter*. For our *Thoughts* are capable of an infinite *Diversity*; but what *Diversity* can arise from the successive Application of the same *Matter* to different Parts of *Space*? Begin with *A*, and suppose different Parts of *Space* to the End of the Alphabet; and if the *Motion* from *A* to *B* could possibly produce an *Idea*, that *Idea* must necessarily continue the same to the

End

End of the imagined *Space*; as the Parts of this *Space* are undoubtedly *homogeneous*, and therefore could produce no Change in the *Motion*, nor consequently in the *Idea*.

We must not, however, forget, that it is not *the Motion of Matter in general*, that is supposed to produce *Ideas*; but the *Motion of a certain System of Matter*. But is the *Matter of this System* in any Respect different from other *Matter*? Or does the *Motion of this Matter* differ from the *Motion of any other Matter*? One, or both of these Things must certainly be true, or all *Matter in Motion* must think alike. But, that either of them is true, I apprehend, Dr. Priestley will not undertake to prove; because the contrary may undeniably be shewn upon his Hypothesis. For the *Flesh of a dead Animal* has all the *Doctor* thinks essential to

3

Matter;

Matter; *Extension, Attraction, Repulsion*. It has yet more; it has a *Capability of Motion*; for a Football may be thrown in any Direction, and with any Degree of Velocity.

Mere *Motion* can do no more to the *Whole*, than it can to the *Parts* separately. Suppose, if you please, Millions of Millions of Particles, and give to the Mass, composed of these Particles, Millions of Millions of Times as much Velocity, as could be conceived to belong to a single Atom; yet still there would be nothing but *Matter* and *Motion*. Take a Million of Figures, and add, subtract, multiply, and divide, as long as you please; [the Products, the Remainders, the Quotients will still be, as they were at first, mere Figures.

*The Comparison of Ideas* having been objected to Dr. Priestley's Theory of *Vibrations*, he says in Answer, that  
 " the Brain, being the percipient Power,  
 " as well as the Subject of these Vibra-  
 " tions, must feel, not only every par-  
 " ticular Impression made upon it, but  
 " also all, that can result from the Com-  
 " bination of ever so many Impressions  
 " at the same Time \*." And be it ad-  
 mitted, that the Brain may feel a Com-  
 bination of Impressions at the same  
 Time; but can it alike feel a *present Im-*  
*pression*, and the *Idea* or *Copy* of one  
 made upon it several Years past? The  
*Idea* or *Copy* of an *Impression*, Mr. Hume  
 observes, is *fainter* than the *Impression*.  
 And if the percipient Power cannot feel  
 a present *Impression*, and the *Copy* of a  
 past one with equal Force and Energy;  
 as the Vibratory Power can, in this

\* *Disquisitions*, p. 90.

Case, convey nothing to the percipient Power, but one *strong* Vibration and another *weak* one; the percipient Power can by no Means judge of Ideas, so altogether inadequate to the Truth of Things, with any Exactness. Indeed nothing can be conceived to be stored up in a Power, that is *merely percipient in consequence of Vibrations*, that is, in consequence of immediate *Impressions*. Whatever such a Power may perceive, when irritated to Perception by actual Vibrations, must for ever stand alone, and uncompar'd with any Thing *past* or *future*. For, upon this System, *Ideas* are nothing more than a *Succession of Impressions*, whose Fate must be to die away with the *Vibrations*, and be forgotten. An *Impression* is made on the Brain, which vibrates in Obedience; and *perhaps* a Perception is produced; but when the Brain ceases to vibrate, the



Perception vanishes. And what can possibly regenerate it, but a similar Vibration? And what can cause that Vibration; but a similar Impression from the very Object, that first made it? It seems not only absolutely impossible, in this Way, to bring a past Perception, and one arising from an immediate Impression, fairly before the percipient Power, in Order for Comparison; but there seems a very great Difficulty in conceiving, how any two immediate Impressions, unless made on different Parts of the Brain, and by that Means exciting distinct Vibrations in the same Moment, should ever be compared. For the Vibration of the whole Brain can produce but one distinct Perception; the Moment that Vibration ceases, the Perception ceases likewise. The Brain may indeed immediately have a new Vibration, and a new Perception; but the former is vanished;

and there is no Possibility of comparing two Perceptions, that are not *co-existent*.

*Man*, without *Mind*, would be, as Mr. Hume represents him, “ a mere  
 “ *Bundle, or Collection of different Per-*  
 “ *ceptions, which succeed each other*  
 “ *with inconceivable Rapidity, and are*  
 “ *in a perpetual Flux and Movement.*  
 “ *There could be properly no Simplicity*  
 “ *in him at one Time, nor Identity at*  
 “ *different Times\* ;*” or rather, in strict  
 Propriety, *Man* could not be said to con-  
 sist even of a *Bundle of Perceptions* ; for a  
*Bundle* must have something, that holds  
 the several Parts together. But, without  
 Mind, *Ideas* could not be so much as  
*bundled*. They could have no *Connection* ;  
 nor could it be said that they belonged  
 to one *Person*, rather than to another,  
 or that there was such a Thing as *Per-*

\* Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I. p. 439.

son; nor could it be ever known, that the various Sensations, excited by one Object, belong to one Subject; for perfectly distinct are the Reports, which the Organs of Sense make of what passes without; and, without *Mind*, distinct and unconnected would they for ever remain. *The Figure* of a Flower and its *Colours* might make an Impression on the *Retina*, and its *Effluvia* on the *olfactory Nerves*; but it is *Intelligence* that unites the Sensations, and says, it is the *Figure*, the *Colour*, and *Smell* of a Rose \*. *Ετι μελλει αισθανεσθαι τινος, ΕΝ αυτο δει ειναι, και τω αυτω παντος αντιλαμβανεσθαι. κ.τ.λ. Το δε ΕΝ ποιων τωτο ο νους εκαστον †.*

If

\* Plotinus, as quoted in the Intellectual System, p. 324.

† Aristot. de Animâ, Lib. III. cap. 6.

See also Bp. Berkeley's *Siris*, Sect. 356, 357.

“ One Sense cannot judge of the Objects of another.” “ That which views and compares the Objects of all the Senses, and judges of them, cannot

If *Sensations* and *Ideas* do not belong to a *Sentient*, whose *Sensations* and *Ideas* are they? I may have a round Dozen of them at the same Time; but how comes it, that these distinct *Sensations* and *Ideas* do not form so many distinct Persons? What have they to do with one another? How come they to conspire to form *Unity*? Sure Man, on the material Hypothesis, must be as many *distinct Beings*, as he has *distinct Sensations*. *Sensations* without a *Sentient*! *Thought* without a *Thinker*! An *Act* without an *Agent*! A *Crime* without a *Criminal*! These, O Philosophy, are

“ cannot be Sense, or any Power, that has any Affinity to it.”—Dr. Price’s Review, &c. p. 21.

“ Quid quod eâdem mente res dissimillimas comprehendimus, ut *colorem, saporem, calorem, odorem, sonum*? quæ nunquam quinque nuntiis animus cognosceret, nisi ad eum omnia referrentur, & is *omnium judex solus esset*.”—Cicer. Tuscul. Quest. Lib. I.

the Wonders thou hast wrought! But, in Fact, these are not the thousandth Part of the Miracles modern Philosophy has brought forth.

*Sensations and Ideas*, which are Days, nay Years, asunder, in a Manner distant and unconnected as Saturn and Mercury, hast thou coupled and chained together to form *Identity*! My *Vibrations* and *Ideas* of to-day rejoice in *the Vibrations and Ideas* of my Youth; my *Vibrations and Ideas* of to-morrow—my *wise Vibrations and Ideas* of to-morrow—may grieve for the *foolish Vibrations and Ideas* of my Youth. My *Vibrations and Ideas* are communicated to a distant Friend; and, as soon as he receives them, they generate in his Brain *similar Vibrations and Ideas*. And will *these Vibrations and Ideas*, the Moment they become his, form *Identity* also? And shall my Friend

and I be in *Person*, as in *Thought*, the same? This certainly should be the Case upon this System.—And yet it is not.—But it is no Wonder. Contradictions are nothing to this Philosophy; it is her Glory to triumph over them, to be believed in spite of them. But I, who am not her Votary, beg leave to think, that the *Faculty of tasting* is something different from the *Taste*; for the *Faculty* may subsist, when I have not this *Sensation*. And I beg leave also to think, that the *Mind*, which now possesses this *Faculty*, is distinct from the *Faculty*; for it is conceivable, that the *Mind* may be without it. Yes! the *Thinker* must be something distinct from his *Sensations and Ideas*—something, whose *Identity* subsists, while his *Sensations and Ideas* are perpetually in *Flux*.

Τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ταγαθὸν διαπονεῖν, καὶ ἑαυτὸ  
ἐνεκα' τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικῆς χάρις, ὅπερ ἑκάστος

ειναι δοκει \*. Δοξειε δ' αν το νοον εκαστος  
ειναι †. Mens cujusque is est quisque ‡.

Dr. Priestley asserts, that “ the Notion  
“ of two Substances, that have no com-  
“ mon Property, and yet are capable of  
“ an intimate Connection, is absurd—  
“ and that it is impossible to be con-  
“ ceived §.” For my own part, I can  
easily conceive the Possibility of such  
Connection; for I can conceive, that  
the one may be capable of receiving  
what the other may be capable of giving.  
Matter, we know, may be put in Mo-  
tion; and we have only to suppose, that  
an intelligent Substance may have the  
Power of communicating Motion; and

\* Aristot. Ethic. Nichom. Lib. IX. 4.

† Ibid. Vide etiam, Lib. X. cap. 7.

‡ Cicero.

§ Disquisitions, Introduction, p. 38, and p. 61.

we have one plain Instance of the Possibility of connecting Matter and Mind. The Doctor, though he makes *Attraction* and *Repulsion essential* to Matter, yet by no Means supposes, that they are *self-existent in it* †. But these Powers, which are not *self-existent* in Matter, and have no common Property with it (for they have neither *Length*, *Breadth*, nor *Thickness*) affect Matter; and I find no more difficulty in conceiving, that Matter may be affected by *the Powers of a distinct Substance*, than that they may be affected by *Powers*, that are not *self-existent in it*.

“ A Substance, that is hard, may act  
 “ upon, and be acted upon by, another  
 “ hard Substance, or even one that is  
 “ soft; which in fact is only relatively  
 “ less hard; but it is certainly impossible,

† Disquisitions, p. 7.

“ that



“ that it should affect, or be affected by,  
 “ a Substance, that can make no Resist-  
 “ ance at all”—says Dr. Priestley \*.  
 And yet a Substance, hard or soft, is  
 acted upon by *Powers*, which are neither  
 hard nor soft. “ *Powers*, or *Laws*, are  
 “ not real Beings; they are nothing but  
 “ mere *Words* or *Notions*; and can nei-  
 “ ther act in any Sense, nor move Mat-  
 “ ter, either by Contact or without it.  
 “ I conceive an ordinary Reader may  
 “ be able to discern the Difference, be-  
 “ tween affirming, that *an immaterial*  
 “ *Substance*, a real Being, though not  
 “ hard and solid, may move Matter;  
 “ and affirming, that a *Law* or *Power*,  
 “ a mere Word or Term of Art, which  
 “ is really nothing, and has not truly  
 “ any Being or Existence, save only in  
 “ the Imagination, can cause Matter to

\* Disquisitions, p. 61.

“ move \*.” “ If God cannot join  
 “ Things together by Connections in-  
 “ conceivable to us, we must deny even  
 “ the Consistency and Being of Matter  
 “ itself; since every Particle of it hav-  
 “ ing some Bulk, has its Parts connected  
 “ by ways inconceivable to us †.”  
 “ Tell me, how *Matter* acts upon *Mat-*  
 “ *ter* without Contact, and I will un-  
 “ dertake to tell you, how *Matter* acts  
 “ upon *an immaterial Substance* ‡.”  
 “ What is said of Forces residing in  
 “ Bodies, whether attracting or repel-  
 “ ling, is to be regarded only as a ma-  
 “ thematical Hypothesis, and not as any  
 “ Thing really existing in Nature §.”

\* Dr. Clarke's Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell.—See also Dr. Price on Providence, p. 73, &c.

† Locke's Essay, Book IV. Chap. III. 6. Note.

‡ Dr. Clarke's Fourth Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell.

§ Bp. Berkeley's *Siris*, Sect. 234.

“ *At-*

“ *Attraction* cannot produce, and in  
 “ that Sense account for, the Phæno-  
 “ mena, being itself one of the Phæno-  
 “ mena produced, and to be accounted  
 “ for \*.”

Mr. Locke says, “ *It is certain, there*  
 “ *is a spiritual, immaterial Substance, the*  
 “ *great Creator †.*” This indeed he  
 has demonstrated ‡. Now, this spiri-  
 tual, immaterial Substance *has acted upon*  
*Matter*; and Dr. Priestley allows, *that*  
*he constantly supports, and at Pleasure*  
*controls the Laws of Nature.* It is  
 therefore out of Question, that Matter  
 may be acted upon by what is *immaterial.*  
 Even, according to Dr. Priestley, “ the  
 “ divine Essence is nothing, that was  
 “ ever called *Matter*, but something

\* Bp. Berkeley's *Siris*, Sect. 243.

† Essay, Book IV. Chap. III. 6. Note.

‡ Book IV. Chap. X.

“ essentially different from it \*.” “ He  
 “ can produce Powers—change them,  
 “ as he pleases, or take them all away;  
 “ he can produce Substance, or anni-  
 “ hilate it; he acts every where; he  
 “ must be every where †.”

I must here observe, that Mr. Locke has proved, that Matter cannot produce Motion—nor Matter and Motion pro-

\* Disquisitions, p. 152.

If there is one Substance, *that was never called Matter, but is essentially different from it*, there can be no Difficulty in conceiving, there may be any Number of such Substances. A Substance, *acknowledged not to be Matter*, not only has acted, but constantly acts, upon Matter; and as Matter has not, we are sensible, the Power of moving itself—and all Creatures, which have Life, have such a Power—it is rational to conclude, that *an immaterial Substance* is vitally united with all such *material Substances*.

† Disquisitions, p. 106, 7.

duce Thought \*. The Inference is plain; *we think, we move.* There is, consequently, *an immaterial Mover within us*; or we are constantly acted upon from without by *something immaterial.* It is most wonderful that Mr. Locke should suppose it impossible, we should know, whether any mere material Being thinks †.

I have already observed, that Dr. Priestley has affirmed, that “ we have

\* Essay, Book, IV. Chap. X. 10.

† Essay, Book IV. Chap. III. 6.

“ Si dicerem non magis conceptu difficile esse,  
 “ quomodo mens humana, quæ non est extensa,  
 “ possit movere corpus, & quomodo corpus, quod  
 “ non est res spiritualis, agere possit in mentem,  
 “ quam quomodo corpus aliquod vim habeat se mo-  
 “ vendi, motumque suum communicandi alteri cor-  
 “ pori, non puto me fidem inventurum apud animos  
 “ multorum hominum : cum tamen nihil verius dici  
 “ possit.”—Tractat. de Menta humanâ (Autore  
 Ludov. de la Forge) Cap. XVI.

“ no proper Idea of any Effence what-  
 “ soever \*.” He adds, “ we cannot  
 “ speak of Attraction and Repulsion,  
 “ but as Powers belonging to, and re-  
 “ siding in, some Thing, Substance, or  
 “ Effence ; but our Ideas do not go  
 “ beyond these Powers †.” Now, I  
 thought, we had an Idea of *Extension*.  
 I am sure, he has asserted, that what-  
 ever it is within us, that has a percipient  
 Power, must be extended, *because we*  
*have an Idea of Extension.*

“ The Term, *Immateriality*, he is  
 “ confident, never did, or could, sug-  
 “ gest any Idea whatsoever ‡.” Not,  
 indeed,

\* Disquisitions, p. 104.

† Disquisitions, p. 105. ..

‡ Disquisitions, p. 105.

Dr. Priestley says, (p. 59) “ It is impossible,  
 “ *even in Idea*, to suppose the Annihilation of *Space*.”  
 Now, if it cannot be annihilated *even in Idea*, we  
 must

indeed, according to his System; in which the Mind is supposed to perceive nothing but *Impressions*, and *Ideas*, that are *the Copies of those Impressions*; for it is certain, that the Soul never had an Impression of Immateriality. But if Mr. Locke had a just Notion of an Idea, and it is, *whatever the Mind is employed about whilst thinking* \*—then we may have an Idea of *Immateriality*; for if we can reason about it, we can certainly think of it; or we can reason without thinking.

must certainly have an *Idea* of it. But surely one may say of *Space* what he says of *Immateriality*; for the Term *Space*, never having made any other Impression on the Organs of Sense, than the Term *Immateriality* makes, never did, upon the Doctor's Scheme, suggest any Idea whatsoever. There is certainly no more Difficulty in the Idea of *Immateriality*, than there is in the Idea of *Space*.

\* Essay—Introduction, Sect. 8. and Book II.  
Chap. I. 1.

Talk without thinking, and write without thinking! alas! it is but too certain we all can. The Doctor would not, I suppose, deny, that we have an Idea of *Attraction and Repulsion*; but we have no Idea of them, but from their Effects; and we have an Idea of a thinking, immaterial Principle in the same Way. The *Substance, or Essence*, that supports Attraction and Repulsion, is, according to the Doctor, as much unknown to us, as *the Substance or Essence of the Immaterial Principle*. We have, therefore, upon the Doctor's own Principles, as just an Idea of *Immateriality*, as we have of *Matter*.

“ So strange an Idea is *Matter*, and  
 “ so little comprehensible to common  
 “ Ideas, that the Greeks had no name  
 “ for it, till ΥΑΗ came to be adopted  
 “ as the proper Word; which was at  
 “ first



“ first only assumed by way of Meta-  
 “ phor, from signifying *Timber* or *Wood*,  
 “ the common Materials in any Work  
 “ of Art \*.” The same may be said of  
 the Latin *Materia*, and *Materies*, from  
 which the English Word *Matter* is de-  
 rived. “ It is evident, that having no  
 “ other Idea or Notion of Matter, but  
 “ something wherein those many sen-  
 “ sible Qualities, which affect our Senses,  
 “ do subsist; by supposing a Substance,  
 “ wherein *thinking, knowing, doubting,*  
 “ and a *Power of moving, &c.* do subsist,  
 “ *we have as clear a Notion of the Sub-*  
 “ *stance of Spirit,* as we have of Body;  
 “ the one being supposed to be (without  
 “ knowing what it is) the Substratum to  
 “ those simple Ideas we have from with-  
 “ out; and the other supposed (with a  
 “ like Ignorance of what it is) to be the

\* Harris's Philosophical Arrangements, p. 75.

“ Substratum to those Operations, which  
 “ we experiment in ourselves within.  
 “ It is plain then, that the Idea of *corporeal Substance* in Matter, is as remote  
 “ from our Conceptions and Apprehensions, as that of *Spiritual Substance*, or  
 “ *Spirit*. And therefore, from our not  
 “ having any Notion of *the Substance of*  
 “ *Spirit*, we can no more conclude its  
 “ Non-existence, than we can, for the  
 “ same Reason, deny the Existence of  
 “ *Body*: It being as rational to affirm,  
 “ there is no *Body*, because we have no  
 “ clear and distinct Idea of *the Substance*  
 “ *of Matter*, as to say, there is no *Spirit*,  
 “ because we have no clear and distinct  
 “ Idea of *the Substance of a Spirit*  
 “ *rit* \*.”

Dr. Priestley indeed observes, that  
 “ Metaphysicians affirm, that we have

\* Locke's Essay, Book II. Chap. XXIII. 5. See also Sect. 15, &c. &c.

“ as clear an Idea of Spirit, as we have  
 “ of Matter, each being equally the un-  
 “ known Support of known Properties ;  
 “ *Matter*, of *Extension* and *Solidity* ; *Spi-*  
 “ *rit*, of *Sensation* and *Thought* \*” But  
 still, he adds, “ since the Substance is  
 “ unknown to us, it must also be un-  
 “ known to us, what Properties it is  
 “ capable of supporting.” A Doctrine  
 this, I apprehend, that will make it al-  
 together uncertain, whether there is any  
 such Thing as *Matter* or *Spirit*. For  
 he says truly, that “ it will hardly be  
 “ pretended, that we have any proper  
 “ Idea of *Matter*, considered as divested  
 “ of all its Properties †.” And if this  
 be not a solid Objection to the Existence  
 of *Matter*, it certainly can be none to  
 the Existence of *Spirit* ; for it lies equally  
 against both. The Doctor adds, “ Un-

\* Disquisitions, page 72.

† Disquisitions, p. 104.

“ less there be a real Inconsistency in  
 “ the Properties themselves, those, which  
 “ have hitherto been ascribed to both  
 “ Substances, may belong to either of  
 “ them \*.” But it has, in my Judgment, been proved, by Dr. Clarke, in the fullest Manner, that *Consciousness* cannot reside in a Substance, that consists of a Multitude of separate, distinct Parts. *Thought*, the Property of *Mind*, is absolutely inconsistent with *Divisibility*, which is a Property of *Matter*. Μαλιζα δε εοικεν ιδιον TO NOEIN †. Το εμψυχον δη τω αψυχη δυοιν μαλιζα διαφερειν δοκει, κινησει και τω αισθανεσθαι ‡.

\* Disquisitions, p. 104.

† Aristot. de Animâ, Lib. I. 1.

Ει μεν εν εσι τι της ψυχης εργα η παθηματων ιδιον, ενδεχοιτ' αν αυτην χωριζεσθαι. He says, just before — ιδιον TO NOEIN.

‡ Ibid. Cap. II.

Δηλον οτι εχ' οιον τε ειναι σωμα την υσιαν αυτης (ψυχης.) — Aristot. de Juvent. & Senectate, Cap. I.

Mr. Wollaston having said, that could Matter reflect upon what passes within itself, it could possibly find there nothing but material, *particular* Impressions; *abstract*, metaphysical Ideas could not be found upon it; Dr. Priestley answers, that “Locke and others have observed, that all actual Ideas are, in fact, particular, and that Abstraction is nothing more than leaving out of a Number of resembling Ideas, what is peculiar to each, and considering only what is common to them all\*.” But this does not, I apprehend, alter the Case in the least. I have just now said, that an Idea is whatever the Mind is employed about in thinking. The Mind never received from Matter any other than *particular* Impressions; and therefore, if, in thinking, it can leave out of a number of resembling Ideas

\* Disquisitions, p. 84.

what is peculiar to each, and consider only what is common to them all;— whenever it does this, it has an Idea, that is not *particular*, and which of consequence does not correspond to any *Impression* made upon it by *Matter* \*. How the

\* Bp. Berkeley, the declared Enemy of abstract Ideas, acknowledges, “ that we have some Notion of  
 “ *Soul, Spirit, and the Operations of the Mind*, such as  
 “ *willing, loving, hating*, in as much as we *know*, or  
 “ *understand* the Meaning of those Words.”—Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. 27. “ We com-  
 “ *prehend* our own *Existence* by inward Feeling or  
 “ Reflection, and that of other Spirits by Reason.  
 “ We may be said to have some *Knowledge* or *Notion*  
 “ of *our own Minds*, of *Spirits* and *active Beings*,  
 “ whereof in a strict Sense we have not *Ideas*. In  
 “ like Manner, we *know* and have a *Notion* of the  
 “ *Relations* between Things or Ideas, which *Rela-*  
 “ *tions* are *distinct* from the *Ideas* or *Things* related, in  
 “ as much as the latter may be perceived by us with-  
 “ out perceiving the former.”—Ibid, Sect. 89. “ In  
 “ a large Sense we may be said to have an *Idea*, or  
 “ rather a *Notion* of *Spirit*; that is, we *understand* the  
 “ Meaning of the Word, otherwise we could not

“ affirm

the *Brain*, that perceives by *Vibrations*, and vibrates by *Impressions*—that never perceives

“ affirm or deny any Thing of it.”—Ibid. Sect. 140.

“ Words, which denote an *active Principle or Spirit*,

“ do not, in a strict and proper Sense, stand for

“ *Ideas*; and yet they are not insignificant neither;

“ since I *understand* what is signified by the Term *I*,

“ or *myself*, or *know* what it means, although it be

“ no *Idea*, nor like an *Idea*, but that, which thinks,

“ wills, and apprehends *Ideas*, and operates about

“ them.”—Minute Philosopher, Dial. VII. Sect. 8.

If we can *know* Things without *Ideas*, then there is

an End of all *Reasoning* about them; “ for every

“ Man’s *Reasoning* and *Knowledge* is only about the

“ *Ideas* existing in his own Mind.”—Locke’s Essay,

Book IV. Chap. XVII. 8. “ *Knowledge* consists in

“ the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement

“ of the *immediate Objects of the Mind in thinking*,

“ which I call *Ideas*.—If others dislike the Term,

“ they may call them *Notions* or *Conceptions*, or how

“ they please; it matters not, if they use them so

“ as to avoid Obscurity and Confusion.”—Essay,

Book IV. Chap. I. 2, Note. “ *Universal Objects of*

“ *the Mind*, though they exist not as such any where

“ without it, yet are they not therefore nothing, but

“ have an intelligible Entity; for this very Reason,

“ because

ceives but when it *vibrates* (and not always then) nor *vibrates* but from *Impressions*—should be able to leave out of a Number of resembling Ideas what is peculiar to each, and to consider only what is common to them all—is, in my judgment, beyond the Power of Man to conceive. No *Impression* to this Purpose can

“ because they are *conceivable*; for since Non-entity  
 “ is not conceivable, *whatever is conceivable, and an*  
 “ *Object of the Mind*, is therefore something. And  
 “ as for axiomatical Truths, in which something is  
 “ affirmed or denied, as these are not all Passions from  
 “ Bodies without us (for what local Motions could  
 “ impress this common Notion upon our Minds, *that*  
 “ *Things, which agree in one Thing, agree amongst them-*  
 “ *selves, or any other?*) so neither are these Things  
 “ only gathered by Induction from repeated and re-  
 “ iterated Sensations, we clearly apprehending at  
 “ once, that it is impossible, they should be other-  
 “ wise.”—Intellectual System, p. 73.

See also Dr. Cudworth's Treatise of Eternal and Immutable Morality, p. 223; and Dr. Price's Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, p. 42, 43.

possibly



possibly be made by external Objects—there can therefore be no *Vibration* purporting all this—nor, of consequence, any such *Perception* or *Idea*.

The Doctor is pleased to assert, that  
 “ to say, that *Reasons* and *Ideas* are not  
 “ Things *material*, or the *Affections* of a  
 “ *material Substance*, is to take for granted  
 “ the very Thing to be proved,” (p. 86.)  
 And indeed as *Reasons* consist of *Words* ;  
 and *Words*, of *Sound* ; and *Sound*, of *Air*  
*in Motion* ; a Half-thinker may inadvertently be led to conclude, that when *Matter* is moved by *Words*, it is moved by the *Affections* of a *material Substance*. But when it is self-evident, that it is the *Sense* of *Words*, and not the *Sound*, that moves a Man, it will be to no Purpose to reason with one, who will not admit, that the *Sense* of *Words* is not *material*.

Has the *Meaning*, suggested to the Mind by particular *Sounds*, any Thing in common with *Matter*? Has it *Extension*, *Attraction*, *Repulsion*? Or is *Sense* one of *the Powers of Matter*? \*

“ The Possibility of thinking in Man, without an organized Body, Dr. Priestley confidently maintains, is destitute

\* The Stoicks, who, like the Doctor, loved a Paradox; went a little farther, and gravely asserted in the Face of the World, that *the Virtues and the Arts, and omnia quæ cogitamus, quæque mente complectimur*, were real, distinct *Animals*. They did not, however, rest the Paradox, as the Doctor has done, upon bare Assertion, but with unblushing Face supported it with Arguments; which I should certainly quote, if I found myself disposed, with Seneca, ludos mihi ex his subtilibus ineptiis facere, (Ep. Chap. CXIII.) It is rather, I think, humiliating to reflect, that such Whimfies should ever have been maintained even in the Infancy of Science; but it is doubly so to find Paradoxes, not inferior in Absurdity, seriously asserted in this enlightened Age.

“ of

“ of all Evidence from actual Appear-  
 “ ance \*.” And he thinks, that “ if  
 “ the Mind was capable of subsisting by  
 “ itself, it might be expected to discover  
 “ some Signs of Independence before  
 “ Death †.” And who is there, that  
 has not, some Time or other, been en-  
 gaged, during Sleep, in Conversation  
 with Friends—endeavoured to entertain  
 them—and been entertained by them?  
 There is not perhaps a Person in the  
 World, who has not beheld in his  
 Dreams the most romantic and delight-  
 ful Scenery, and heard Music superior to  
 any, he ever enjoyed in his waking  
 Hours. But did his own, or any other  
 Tongue, form the Sentences, that were  
 then heard? Did his Eye convey to his  
 Mind the Scenes, he beheld, or his Ear

\* Disquisitions, p. 34.

† Disquisitions, p. 35.

the Sounds, that delighted him? \*. Every Man therefore, who has ever experienced any Thing similar to this, must be satisfied, that there is something within him, that is not *Eye*, or *Ear*; and that it is possible, he may *see* and *bear* without the Assistance of those Organs †. Dreams, it cannot be denied, are *generally* very imperfect; but they

\* — “ Molli somno cum dedita membra,  
 “ Effusumque jacet sine sensu corpus onustum :  
 “ Est aliud tamen in nobis, quod tempore in illo  
 “ Multimodis agitur; & omnes accipit in se  
 “ Lætitiæ motus, & curas cordis inaneis.”

Lucret. Lib. I. 113.

† Xenophon, in the Person of Cyrus, reasons thus: “ You ought not to conclude from your  
 “ seeing me no longer, that I shall cease to be, when  
 “ this Life is terminated; for even now you do not  
 “ see my Soul. The Body is senseless and inactive;  
 “ it is the Soul that gives Life, Sense, and Vigour  
 “ to it. I cannot therefore persuade myself, that the  
 “ Soul will lose all Sense, when it has left this sense-  
 “ less

they are *sometimes* very far from being so. I have often enjoyed, in Sleep, such

“ less Body. Rather must I think, that its Powers will  
 “ be increased, as it will be no longer clogged with  
 “ senseless Matter. At Death, the Body of Man,  
 “ we see, resolves into its original Principles: But  
 “ this cannot be said of the Soul; for the Soul con-  
 “ tinues invifible.”

Ου γαρ δήπρ τῆτο γε σαφὺς ὀκειτε εἰδέναι, ὡς  
 ἔδεν εἶσομαι ἐγὼ ἐτι, ἐπειδάν τῶ ἀνθρώπινω βίω  
 τελευτήσω· ἔδε γάρ νυν τοι τὴν γέμνη ψυχὴν ἐώρατε,  
 ἀλλ’ οἷς διεπραττετο, τῆτοις αὐτὴν ὡς ἔσαν κατε-  
 φώρατε.—Οὗτοι ἐγὼ γε, ὦ παῖδες, ἔδε τῆτο πῶποτε  
 ἐπεισθῆν, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐὼς μὲν ἀν ἐν θνήτῳ σώματι  
 ἦ, ζῆ· ὅταν δὲ τῆτω ἀπαλλαγῆ, τεθνήκεν. Ὅρω  
 γάρ, ὅτι καὶ τὰ θνήτα σώματα, ὅσον ἀν ἐν αὐτοῖς  
 χρόνον ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ, ζῶντα παρεχεται. Οὐδὲ γε,  
 ὅπως ἀφρων ἐσαι ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐπειδάν τῶ ἀφρονος σώμα-  
 τος δίχα γενῆται, ἔδε τῆτο πεπεισμαι· ἀλλ’ ὅταν  
 ἀκρατος καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ νῦς ἐκκρίθῆ, τότε καὶ φρονι-  
 μοτατον εἶκος αὐτον εἶναι. Διαλυομένω δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ,  
 δήλα ἐσὶν ἕκαστα ἀπιόντα πρὸς τὸ ὁμοφυλον, ἅπλην  
 τῆς ψυχῆς· αὐτὴ δὲ μόνῃ ἐτε παρῆσα ἐτε ἀπισσα  
 ἔραται.—De Cyri Institut. Lib. VIII. 47.

Nolite arbitrari, O ! mihi carissimi filii, me cum  
 a vobis discessero, nusquam aut nullum fore : nec  
 enim

such Conversations, as have put my Faculties to the Stretch, more than Conversation, when I am awake, generally does; and I do not imagine, that I am particular in this \*.

“ Though from  
“ our

enim dum eram vobiscum, animum meum videbatis, sed cum esset in hoc corpore, ex iis rebus, quas gerebam, intelligebatis: eundem igitur esse creditote, etiamsi nullum videbitis.—Mihi quidem nunquam persuaderi potuit, animos, dum in corporibus essent mortalibus vivere; cum exiissent ex iis, emori: nec vero tum animum esse insipientem, cum ex insipienti corpore evasisset; sed, cum, omni admixtione corporis liberatus, purus & integer esse cœpisset, tum esse sapientem. Aque etiam cum hominis natura morte dissolvitur; cæterarum rerum perspicuum est quo quæque discedant; abeunt enim illic omnia, unde orta sunt; animus autem solus nec cum adest, nec cum discedit, apparet.—Cicer. de Senectute.

\* “ We are somewhat more than ourselves in our  
“ Sleeps, and the Slumber of the Body seems to be  
“ but the waking of the Soul. It is the Ligation of  
“ Sense, but, the Liberty of Reason; and our wak-  
“ ing Conceptions do not match the Fancies of our  
“ Sleeps.”—“ I am no way facetious; yet in one  
“ Dream

“ from our present Constitution and  
 “ Condition of Being, our external Or-  
 “ gans of Sense are necessary for con-  
 “ veying any Ideas to our reflecting  
 “ Powers, as Carriages, and Levers, and  
 “ Scaffolds are in Architecture: Yet  
 “ when these Ideas are brought in, we  
 “ are capable of reflecting in the most  
 “ intense Degree, and of enjoying the  
 “ greatest Pleasure, and feeling the  
 “ greatest Pain, by Means of that Re-  
 “ flection, without any Assistance from  
 “ our Senses; and without any at all,  
 “ which we know of, from that Body,  
 “ which will be dissolved by death. It  
 “ does not appear then, that the Rela-  
 “ tion of this gross Body to the reflecting

“ Dream I can compose a whole Comedy, &c.”—

“ Were my Memory as faithful, as my Reason is

“ then fruitful, I would never study but in my

“ Dreams, &c.”—Brown’s *Religio Medici*, Part II.

11.—See the Story in the Annotations.

“ Being is, in any Degree, necessary to  
 “ thinking; to our intellectual Enjoy-  
 “ ments or Sufferings; nor consequently  
 “ that the Dissolution, or Alienation of  
 “ the former by Death, will be the De-  
 “ struction of these present Powers,  
 “ which render us capable of this State  
 “ of Reflection †.”

Dr. Priestley assures us, that “ what-  
 “ ever Ideas are in themselves, they are  
 “ evidently produced by external Ob-  
 “ jects, and must therefore correspond

† Bp. Butler’s Analogy of Religion, natural and revealed, Part I. Chap. I. 3.

“ Atque ea profecto tum multo puriora, & dilu-  
 “ cidiora cernentur, cum, quò natura fert, liber ani-  
 “ mus pervenerit. Nam nunc quidem, quamquam  
 “ foramina illa, quæ patent, ad animum a corpore,  
 “ calidissimo artificio natura fabricata est, tamen ter-  
 “ renis concretisque corporibus sunt intersepta quo-  
 “ dammodo: cum tamen nihil erit præter animum,  
 “ nulla res objecta impediet, quominus percipiat, quale  
 “ quidque sit.”—Cicer. Tuscul. Quæst. Lib. I.

“ to



“ to them \*.” How well they *correspond*, a few Observations will shew. “ The Ideas of sensible, secondary Qualities, which we have in our Minds; can, by us, be no Way deduced from bodily Causes, nor any *Correspondence* and Connection be found between them and those primary Qualities, which (Experience shews us) produce them in us †.” We have a positive Idea of *Inspidity, Silence, Darkness, Nothing*, and many other *Privations*. “ There are therefore Ideas, and simple ones

\* *Disquisitions*, p. 37.

† Locke’s *Essay*, Book IV. Chap. III. 28. See Book II. Chap. VIII. 15, &c.

“ ’Tis a Remark, I know not how to forbear adding here, that *sensible Qualities* being now universally allowed not to be Qualities inherent in Matter, it is strange, the same Thing should not be allowed to be equally evident with respect to *Thought and Consciousness*.”—Dr. Price’s *Review*, p. 70.

“ too, which have nothing *ab extra* cor-  
 “ respondent to them, no proper *Ideatum*,  
 “ *Archetype*, or *objective Reality* \*.”  
 “ No Man ever saw *Space* with his  
 “ Eyes, or heard it, or touched it. It  
 “ is not an object of *Sense*; but a Con-  
 “ clusion drawn from *Reason* †.” Will  
 Dr. Priestley be pleased to inform us,  
 what *Correspondence* there is between the  
*Smell* of a *Rose* and the *Matter*, of which  
 it is composed; its *Extension*, *Figure*,  
*Colour*, *Attraction*, and *Repulsion*? What  
*Resemblance* between the *Sounds*, I hear,  
 and the *Vibration* of the *Matter* con-  
 tained in a *Bell*, or the *Vibration* of the  
*Air*, that is moved by that *Bell*? Has  
*the sweet Taste*, I find upon putting *Sugar*  
 into my *Mouth*, any *Thing*, that is in

\* Bp. Law's Notes to Archbishop King's Origin of Evil, p. 11.

† Baxter's Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, Vol. III. p. 132.

the least like that Body? What *Resemblance* between the *Pain* arising from a *Blow*, and the *Cudgel*, with which it was given, or the *Hand*, that guided the *Cudgel*; between the *Fire* now before me, and the *Warmth* I feel? Is there any, the most distant, Similitude between the *Matter* or *Texture* of a *Ribband*, and the *Colour*, that strikes my *Eyes*, when the *Ribband* is before me?

There is not a Shadow of Ground for this *Resemblance* or *Correspondence* between external Objects and Sensations and Perceptions in any Case but that of Figure; and it is well known, how imperfect that is. “The visible Appearance of an Object is extremely different from the Notion of it, which Experience teaches us to form by Sight\*.” “A Man, newly made to

\* Dr. Reid of the Human Mind, Chap. VI. Sect. 3.

“ see, could perceive little, or nothing  
 “ of the real Figure of Objects; nor  
 “ could he discern, that this was a Cube;  
 “ that a Sphere; that this was a Cone;  
 “ that a Cylinder \*.”

“ A plain Surface, in a certain Po-  
 “ sition, appears as a strait Line—a Cir-  
 “ cle seen obliquely, an Ellipse; and a  
 “ Square, a Rhombus, or an oblong  
 “ Rectangle †.” The Truth is, that  
 the Sight can in no Case communicate  
 any Thing to the Mind but the Surface  
 before it; and that it does often, we  
 see, in a very defective Manner. When  
 the Object lies directly before the Eye,  
 the Sides of an Avenue, that are ac-  
 tually parallel, appear to meet ‡.

It

\* Dr. Reid of the Human Mind, Chap. VI.  
 Sect. 3.

† Ibid. Sect. 2.

‡ “ A Globe of any uniform Colour imprints in  
 “ our Mind a flat Circle variously shadowed—the  
 “ Mind

It is the same Case with our Ideas of Reflection as with our Sensations and Perceptions. They are not, in good Truth, by any Means, so much as faint Copies of our Sensations. I may have an Idea of *Heat*, when I shiver with *Cold*; and an Idea of *Eating*, when I am dying of *Hunger*, &c. &c. “ It is plain  
 “ there comes nothing to us from Bo-  
 “ dies without us, but only local Mo-  
 “ tion and Pressure.—Nothing can be  
 “ more true, than this of Boetius, *omne*  
 “ *quod scitur, non ex suâ vi, sed ex com-*  
 “ *prebendentium naturâ, vi, & facultate*  
 “ *cognoscitur* \*.” External Objects can give nothing more than Impressions to the Organs of Sense †. If these Im-  
 preffions

“ Mind frames to itself the Perception of a convex  
 “ Figure.”—Locke’s Essay, Book II. Chap. IX. 8.

\* Dr. Cudworth’s Intellectual System, p. 731.

† “ Quisquis rectè advertit, quousque sensus  
 “ nostri se extendunt, & quidnam sit præcisè quod

pressions are immediately followed by certain Sensations and Perceptions; or if

our

“ ab illis ad nostram cogitandi facultatem potest per-  
 “ venire, debeat fateri, *nullarum rerum ideas, quales*  
 “ *eas cogitatione formamus, nobis ab illis exhiberi:*  
 “ adeo ut nihil sit in nostris Ideis, quod menti sive  
 “ cogitandi facultati non fuerit innatum, solis iis  
 “ circumstantiis exceptis, quæ ad experientiam spec-  
 “ tant, quod nempe judicamus, has vel illas Ideas,  
 “ quas nunc habemus, cogitationi nostræ præsentis,  
 “ ad res quasdam extra nos positas referri, non quia  
 “ ista res illas ipsas nostræ menti per organa sensuum  
 “ immiserunt; *sed quia tamen aliquid immiserunt,*  
 “ *quod dedit occasionem ad ipsas, per innatum sibi fa-*  
 “ *cultatem, hoc tempore potius quam alio, efformandas.*  
 “ Quippe nihil ab objectis externis ad mentem nos-  
 “ tram per organa sensuum accidit, *præter motus*  
 “ *quosdam corporeos* — sed ne quidam ipsi motus, nec  
 “ figuræ ex iis ortæ, a nobis concipiuntur, quales  
 “ in organis sensuum fiunt, ut fusè in Dioptricâ ex-  
 “ plicai: unde sequitur, *ipsas motuum & figurarum*  
 “ *Ideas nobis esse innatas: ac tanto magis innatæ*  
 “ *esse debent Ideæ doloris, colorum, sonorum, & simi-*  
 “ *lium, ut mens nostra, possit occasione quorundam*  
 “ *motuum corporeorum sibi ipsas exhibere: nullam*  
 “ *enim similitudinem cum motibus corporeis habent.*

“ Quid

our past Sensations and Perceptions are  
at any Time revived without fresh Im-  
pressions;

“ Quid autem magis absurdum fingi potest, quam  
“ quod omnes *communes notiones*, quæ menti nostræ  
“ insunt, ab iis motibus oriantur, & sine illis esse  
“ non possint? Vellem *noster* me doceret, quisnam  
“ ille sit corporeus motus, qui possit in mente nostrâ  
“ *formare aliquam communem notionem*, exempli causâ,  
“ *quod quæ eadem sunt uni tertio, sint eadem inter se*,  
“ vel quamvis aliam: omnes enim isti motus sunt  
“ *particulares, notiones vero illæ universales; & nullam*  
“ *cum motibus affinitatem, nullamve ad ipsos relationem*  
“ *habentes.*”

I shall explain what the Author means by *Innate Ideas*, in his own Words.

“ Cum adverterem, quasdam in me esse cogita-  
“ tiones, quæ non ab objectis externis, nec a vo-  
“ luntatis meæ determinatione procedebant, *sed a*  
“ *solâ cogitandi facultate, quæ in me est*, ut *Ideas* five  
“ notiones, quæ sunt istarum cogitationum formæ, ab  
“ aliis adventitiis aut factis distinguerem, illas inna-  
“ tas vocavi: eodem sensu, quo dicimus generosita-  
“ tem esse quibusdam familiis innatam, alios vero  
“ quosdam morbos, ut podagram vel calculum, *non*  
“ *quod ideo istarum familiarum Infantes morbis istis in*  
“ *utero*

pressions; the whole Business is entirely the Transaction of Mind. Our Sensations, Perceptions, and Ideas never were in Matter; nor can they possibly be in it, or resemble it;

“ *The Soul discerns them by her proper Light.*”

DAVIES.

The Impressions made on the Organs of Sense by material Objects, are the Instruments, which the God of Nature is pleased to use in raising certain Sensations and Perceptions in our Souls. And this seems to be the whole of the Busi-

“ *utero matris laborent, sed quod nascantur cum quâdam*

“ *dispositione sive facultate ad illos contrahendos.*”

Renati Des Cartès Notæ ad programma quoddam, juxta finem Partis primæ Epistolarum.

“ When we reason upon *Power, Life, Activity,*

“ *Perception,* the Soul is busied neither about Mat-

“ ter, nor any Affection, that can belong to Mat-

“ ter.”—Baxter’s Enquiry into the Nature of the

Human Soul, Vol. I. p. 276.



ness. Matter has no Activity. I know not how to bring myself to believe, that it should produce any Thing; but that it should produce *a Sensation, a Perception, an Idea!* Things so totally dissimilar to itself, is, I am confident, absolutely impossible. But be this as it may; nothing can be more self-evident, than that the Ideas, I have, of external Objects, when no Impressions are made by them upon the Organs of Sense, are not produced by external Objects. Our *Ideas of Reflection* are mere Creatures of the Mind, and owe their Existence so entirely to its Operations, that they are altogether incomprehensible in any other Way. Suppose it possible, if you please, that a Sensation or Perception may be produced by *a Vibration of the Brain*; yet the Brain, that perceives only by *Vibrations*, cannot perform *one reflex Act*. Will you say, that it may bring on those  
 Vibrations

Vibrations a second Time ? But how can that, which perceives only by Vibrations, contrive to repeat those Vibrations, or indeed know, which are the Vibrations; it will be necessary to repeat ? To suppose, that it can do this, is to suppose, that it can perceive without Vibrations, and that it can direct the Vibrations, by which it is to perceive; which, I think, is an Absurdity too great to be digested even by Infidelity\*.

It

\* “ If the Soul at any Time, while it is united  
 “ to Matter, were in a State of total Inactivity and  
 “ Imperceptivity,” (as it must frequently be, if it  
 has no Ideas but from Vibrations, nor Vibrations,  
 but from Impressions) “ it would be in a State of  
 “ Deadness, as much as Matter itself, which never  
 “ had, and never can have these Powers; and it  
 “ would be impossible for it to recover itself out of  
 “ such a State; just as it is impossible for any Thing,  
 “ that never had Life, to make itself living. If it  
 “ could recover itself, it must be *by an Act of the*  
 “ *Will*, i. e. it must will its own Recovery; but  
 “ this is plainly contradictory; for That would infer,  
 “ that it was previously recovered, since it had *the*  
 “ *Power*

It seems to be not-unimportant to observe here, that if our Ideas of Reflection are nothing more than a Repetition of *Vibrations*, no adequate Reason seems assignable, why our *Vibrations* and *Ideas* should not constantly return exactly in their first Order. And yet, if we know any Thing, we certainly know, that the direct contrary is perpetually the Case. For the Mind can not only compound, and decompound its Perceptions and Ideas at Pleasure; but it can raise into Being, Forms and Existences, which have been justly termed *Creatures of the Imagination*, and which never were Objects of

“ *Power of willing*, that is, of Action.”—Baxter’s Enquiry, &c. Vol. I. p. 257.

We cannot suppose a *Will* to revibrate, and so recall the Ideas, that were consequent of past *Vibrations*, without supposing a proper Subject, in which that *Will* may reside. This *Will* must belong to a sentient something, or past Ideas could never be recalled but by fresh Impressions and *Vibrations*.

the external Senses ; such as the whole Order of *Genii, Sylphs, Gnomes, Fairies, Dæmons, &c. &c.*

*The Poet's Eye in a fine Frenzy rolling,  
Doth glance from Heaven to Earth, from  
Earth to Heaven ;*

*And as Imagination bodies forth*

*The Forms of Things unknown, the Poet's  
Pen*

*Turns them to Shape, and gives to airy  
Nothings*

*A local Habitation and a Name \*.*

Suppose an active, intelligent Substance lodged in the Brain, and all this is at least clear and consistent ; but, without such a Substance, we are reduced to the wretched Necessity of concluding, with Dr. Priestley, that Impressions from external Objects irritate the Organs of

\* Shakespear's *Midsummer Night's Dream*. Act V.  
Scene I.

Sense—that a Vibration of the Brain is consequent of this Irritation—and Ideas not only consequent of the Vibration, but, *ipso facto*, generated by it in all that amazing Variety, of which we are capable! But what is all this, when compared with the Astonishment, that must seize us, when we find ourselves obliged to conclude, that the Brain, which never perceives without a Vibration, nor vibrates without an Impression, most unaccountably takes up a Resolution to vibrate without an Impression—does this, when it pleases—and as often as it pleases—and what is still, if possible, more wonderful, transacts the Business, at Times, much better, than it did, when acting under immediate Impressions?

In other Places Dr. Priestley seems rather more guarded in what he says respecting

specting *Ideas*. “ The Soul has not a  
 “ single Idea, but what it receives by  
 “ *Means of the Organs of Sense* \*.” And  
 in another place; “ There is not a single  
 “ Idea, but what may be proved to  
 “ come to it from the bodily Senses, or  
 “ *to have been consequent of the Percep-*  
 “ *tions of Sense* †.” We have, how-  
 ever, an Infinity of Ideas, in the Pro-  
 duction of which *the Organs of Sense*  
 have not been so much as *instrumental*;  
 and therefore the utmost, that can be  
 fairly said, is, that they are *subsequent to*  
*the Perceptions of Sense*; they cannot,  
 with the least Appearance of Truth, be  
 thought *consequent of them*. We have  
 an Idea of *Right* and *Wrong*; the Facts,  
 on which we formed this Idea, might  
 come to our Knowledge through the  
 Senses, but the *Idea* certainly did not.

\* Disquisitions, p. 96.

† Disquisitions, p. 33.

We doubt; we believe; but what have the Organs of Sense to do in producing these Affections of Mind? I think the Doctor would be puzzled to tell us, through which of our Senses the Ideas of *Being* or *Thought* pass to the percipient Power. We seem to have an intuitive Knowledge of our own *Existence*. It is indeed natural to conceive, that the Perception of our Existence must have been the first of all Perceptions; for the Soul could at no Time perceive without a Consciousness of its own Existence. *Quid sit animal, nescit; animal esse se sentit* \*.

————— Anté

Corpora quàm scires an sint, jam te esse sciebas.  
 Quoniam argumento? Quoniam qui cogitat, ille est,  
 Nec tamen ulla tibi sensum afficiebat imago.  
 Nam cum cæpisti primum sentire dolorem,  
 Nescires licet unde dolor, ipse profectò  
 Jam tibi notus erat; quamvis ignota tibi esset  
 Undique materies, & adhuc tiruncula secum  
 Mens privatim ageret, sibi conscia & obvia soli †.

\* Senec. Epistol. CXXI.

† Anti-Lucret. Lib. V. 616.

If it is undeniable, that we have  
 the Ideas of *Being* and of *Thought*, I  
 ask, through what Senses did they  
 enter? Are they Ideas of *Light* or of  
*Colour*, to enter through the *Sight*?  
 Are they of a shrill or deep *Sound*,  
 to enter through the *Hearing*? Are  
 they *odoriferous* or *noisome*, to enter  
 through the *Smelling*? Are they *sa-*  
*voury* or *nauseous*, to enter through  
 the *Taste*? *Cold* or *hot*, *soft* or *hard*,  
 to enter by the *Feeling*? If it is an-  
 swered, that they are formed from  
 other sensible Images, let them tell  
 us what those other sensible Images  
 are, from whence they pretend, the  
*Ideas* of *Being* and of *Thought* were  
 formed, and how they could be formed  
 either by Composition, or Amplifica-  
 tion, or by Diminution, or by Pro-  
 portion?" &c. &c. "It is therefore  
 false, that all our Ideas proceed from our  
 Senses ;



“ Senses; but it may be affirmed on the  
 “ contrary, that no Idea whatever, which  
 “ is in our Mind, owes its Origin to  
 “ the Senses, unless *occasionally*, that is  
 “ to say, when the Movements made in  
 “ our Brain (which is all our Senses can  
 “ do) give *Occasion* to the Soul to form  
 “ to itself diverse Ideas, which it had  
 “ not formed without these Movements,  
 “ though these Ideas have hardly ever any  
 “ Thing like the Images delineated in  
 “ the Senses, and in the Brain; and that  
 “ there are also a very great Number of  
 “ Ideas, which not having the least  
 “ Mixture of any corporeal Image, can-  
 “ not, without manifest Absurdity, be  
 “ referred to our Senses \*.” Των δὲ

\* Art of Thinking, translated from the French,  
 p. 39, 41. The learned Mr. Baker supposes it to  
 have been written by *M. Arnauld*; (Reflections upon  
 Learning, p. 75.) but in the Translator, Mr. Ozell's  
 Dedication to Sir Joseph Jekyll, it is said to have  
 been composed by *M. Nicole*, and revised and im-  
 proved by *M. Arnauld*.

φαντασιων κατ' αυτης (Στοιχεις) αι μεν εισι  
 αισθητικαι, αι δε ε' Αισθητικαι μεν δι' αισ-  
 θητηρις, η αισθητηριων, λαμβανομεναι. Ουκ  
 αισθητικαι δε, δια της διανοιας, καθ'απερ  
 των ασωματιων, και των αλλων των λογων  
 λαμβανομενων\*.

In Sensation and Perception the Mind  
 may be thought *passive*; but it is far  
 from being so; for it is notorious, that  
 it can, and often does, withhold its  
 Perception †. It is, however, undeni-  
 ably

\* Diogen. Laert. in Vita Zenonis.

† “ Mens enim ipsa, quæ sensuum fons est, atque  
 “ etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam  
 “ intendit ad ea quibus movetur.—Cicer. Academ.  
 Quæst. Lib. II.

“ Nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus, ea quæ  
 “ videmus; neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore; sed  
 “ ut non solum Physici dicunt, verum etiam medici,  
 “ qui ista aperta & patefacta viderunt, viæ quasi  
 “ quædam sunt ad oculos, ad aureis, ad nareis à fede  
 “ animi perforatæ. Itaque sæpe aut cogitatione aut  
 “ aliquâ

ably *active* in drawing Inferences from its Sensations and Perceptions ; and I shall never be made to believe, but we have an Idea, whenever we draw an Inference. We compare two Perceptions or Sensations ; this Comparison is the Mind's Act, and is as clearly distinct from the Sensations and Perceptions, as the Conclusion, we form, is. Indeed, every Perception, we have, may be the *Occasion* of producing numberless Ideas, entirely different from those we have immediately by Means of our Senses ; for we cannot think a Moment upon any

“ aliquâ vi morbi impediti, *apertis atque integris* &  
 “ *oculis* & *auribus*, *nec videmus nec audimus* ; ut fa-  
 “ cilé intelligi possit, *animum et videre* & *audire*, non  
 “ eas parteis, quæ quasi fenestræ sunt animi : quibus  
 “ tamen sentire nihil que at mens, *nisi id agit* &  
 “ *adsit.*” — Cicer. Tuscul. Quæst. Lib. I.

Νες ὄρα και νες ακσει τ' αλλα κωφα και τυφλα.—Epicharmi.

Cæci sunt oculi, cum mens alias res agit.—Publii Syri.

Subject without having new Ideas ; in the Production of which, the first Perception had no other concern, than the having put the Mind on exercising its amazing Powers \*. “ These Ideas may “ be excited or awakened by the Appulse “ of outward Objects at the Door of “ our Senses † ;” but Mind is the im-  
mediate

\* “ By the Power of Reflection, it (the Soul) is “ both the Percipient, and affords the Object of “ Perception to itself, as its former Perceptions be- “ come the Object of subsequent ones.”—Baxter’s Enquiry, &c. Vol. I. p. 266.

† Dr. Cudworth’s Treatise of Eternal and Im-  
mutable Morality, p. 150.

Ουδέποτε γὰρ τὰ χείρω καὶ δευτέρᾳ ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἰτιαὶ εἰσι τῶν κρείττωνων· εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς ἐγκυ- κλιόις ἐξηγήσασθαι, καὶ ἀρχὴν εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰσθησίν τῆς ἐπιστήμης, λέξομεν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν ὅχι ὡς ποιητικὴν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐρεθίζουσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἰς ἀναμνησίν τῶν καθόλου. “ These Things, “ which are inferior and secondary, are by no means “ the Principles or Causes of the more excellent ; and “ though we admit the common Interpretations, and  
“ allow

mediate Actor or productive Cause of them.

When a Machine of any Kind is presented to the Eye, nothing can possibly be imagined there, but a very imperfect drawing of the Parts, of which it is compounded. There is no Image there

of  
 “ allow Sense to be a Principle of Science, we must,  
 “ however, call it a Principle, not as if it was the  
 “ efficient Cause, but as it rouses our Soul to the Re-  
 “ collection of general Ideas.”

From a Manuscript Commentary of the Platonic Olympiodorus upon the Phædo of Plato, as quoted in Mr. Harris's *Hermes*, p. 394.

Mr. Harris very justly observes, that “ though  
 “ some may perhaps object to this Passage, from in-  
 “ clining to the Doctrine of *Platonic Reminiscence*,  
 “ yet it certainly gives a better Account how far the  
 “ Senses assist in the Acquisition of Science, than we  
 “ can find given by vulgar Philosophers.” “ The  
 “ Mind of Man, exercised in the close Observations  
 “ of its own Operations and Nature, cannot but  
 “ discover, that there is an active and actual Know-

of the Motion of any of its Parts; for Motion cannot be painted. Yet from this very inadequate Figure can an ingenious Observer infer all its different Powers and Uses. Vibrations must be owing solely to Impressions; but there is not, even on the Retina, any but a very imperfect Impression of a Part of the external Form of the Machine. Of the internal Figure, as there is no Im-

“ ledge in a Man, of which outward Objects are  
 “ rather the Reminders than the first Begetters or Im-  
 “ planters. And when I say, *actual Knowledge*, I do  
 “ not mean, that there is a certain Number of Ideas  
 “ flaring and shining to the animadversive Faculty,  
 “ like so many Torches or Stars in the Firmament  
 “ to the outward Sight; that there are any Figures,  
 “ that take their distinct Places, and are legibly writ  
 “ there, like the red Letters, or astronomical Cha-  
 “ racters in an Almanack; but I understand thereby  
 “ an active Sagacity in the Soul, or quick Recollec-  
 “ tion, as it were, whereby, some small Business be-  
 “ ing hinted upon her, she runs out presently into a  
 “ more clear and larger Conception.”—Dr. More’s  
 Antidote against Atheism, B. I. Chap. V. 2.

*pression,*

pression, there can be no *Vibration*, and consequently, according to Dr. Priestley, no *Perception*. The *Body's Eye* receives nothing but *Colour* and *Figure*, and the last often in a very imperfect Manner; but the *Mind's Eye* can “ see Cause and Effect, Means and End, Priority and Posteriority, Equality and Inequality, Order and Proportion, Symmetry and Asymmetry, Aptitude and Inaptitude, Sign and Thing signified, Art and Skill, Whole and Part; in a Manner all the logical and relative Notions that are \*.”

I thought

\*Dr. Cudworth's Treatise of Eternal and Immutable Morality, p. 155.

“ All which *relative Ideas* I shall easily prove to be *no material Impresses from without upon the Soul*, but her own active Conception proceeding from herself while she takes notice of external Objects. For that these Ideas can make no Impresses upon the outward Senses is plain from hence, because they are no sensible nor physical Affections of the Mat-

“ ter.

I thought to have ended here; but I recollect that Dr. Priestley says, that “ whenever the Faculty of thinking is “ impeded, or injured, there is sufficient “ Reason to believe, that the Brain is “ disordered in Proportion \*.” But does Anatomy confirm this? If it does, it must be resolved into a Law of our Constitution, that the Mind should be affected, whenever the Body is so; of which indeed we have daily Proofs. But however this may be, I am verily persuaded, that the Phænomena of Insanity are totally inconsistent with the vibratory System. Is the brain of an insane Person incapable of Vibration? The Doctor will perhaps say, it has wrong

“ ter. And how can that, that is no physical Af-  
 “ fection of the Matter, affect our corporeal Organs  
 “ of Sense?”—Dr. More’s Antidote against Atheism,  
 Book L. Chap. VI. 3.

\* Disquisitions, p. 27.



Vibrations. But are not the usual Impressions made on the Organs of Sense? And are not Vibrations consequent of Impressions? And must they not correspond to the Impressions?

In Fact, if the Business of perceiving and thinking can be transacted by Means of Vibrations, it is apparent, that, in Cases of Insanity, there is a general Correspondence between the *Impressions* and *Vibrations*. For the Insane frequently are so only *quoad hoc*; on other points their Ideas and their Conclusions shall be just enough. And this proves sufficiently, that whatever is wrong, is not owing to an Incapacity in the Brain to *vibrate* properly. And if the Brain of an insane Person continues capable of having proper *Vibrations*, it undeniably follows, that the vibratory System is of  
 very

very little Service in accounting for Insanity.

Whatever Difficulties there may be in accounting for the Mind's being affected, when the Body is so, we shall, on Dr. Priestley's Hypothesis, have many more and greater in accounting for the Body's suffering in consequence of the Mind's being affected. Anger, I apprehend, is painful to most People; it has been fatal to many. Grief occasions Hysterics, Consumptions, &c. Indeed, the Doctor acknowledges, that "the Body is liable to be reciprocally affected by the Affections of the Mind \*." And it may truly be said, that for one insane Person there are Thousands, whose Bodies suffer, in the Extreme, in Consequence of the Mind's being affected. But nothing can possibly be more inconceivable than

\* Disquisitions, p. 28.

all this, if we are mere Matter, and perceive merely in consequence of the *Vibrations* of the Brain. . . . Many have died of Joy upon the sudden Appearance of a Friend, who had been long absent ; and upon the hearing of good News. But the Appearance of that Friend formed no other Image upon the Retina, than would have been formed, if he had been seen the Day before. Consequently, no other *Impression* having been made in the one Case than would have been in the other, similar *Vibrations* and similar Consequences might have been expected in both Cases. The Fact, however, has often turned out just the Reverse. The Case is exactly the same with respect to good News, whether received by Message or Letter. In neither Way would it have affected an indifferent Person in the least Degree ; though that Person's *Eyes* and *Ears* would have had the same

*Impressions* made on them; and, upon the *vibratory* Hypothesis, similar Consequences might have been expected.

And now, I think, we may, with great Truth and Confidence, assert, that this laboured System of Materialism rests,

1. *On a glaring Absurdity*—the Penetrability of Matter;—
2. *On a few Difficulties*; which have been proved to lie equally against the Material System;—
3. *On some palpable Mistakes*, to speak of them in the gentlest Terms, respecting the Origin and Nature of our Ideas;—
- and 4. *On many stale Objections*, which, as has been amply shewn in the Course of these Papers, have been, again and again, refuted in Books universally known, and which we cannot but suppose, that Dr. Priestley has read. And I trust, it may, with equal Truth and Confidence, be hoped, that so wretched a System will  
allure

allure none to embrace it, but those, whose wicked Lives have pre-disposed them to wish for Annihilation. To such Persons the Doctor's Work must prove a delicious Morfel. Vicious Men are seldom disposed to reason, if they have a Capacity for it. They will think, upon reading the Disquisitions, that the *Materiality* of the Soul is well proved; and they want nothing more to convince them of its *Mortality*. They will laugh heartily at the remaining Part of the Doctor's Scheme, as concluding, that it was calculated only to lengthen out the Work, and to add to the Price of the Volume. And if the Book sells, the grave Doctor will laugh too. He will consider this Circumstance as an egregious Proof of the Folly of the Age; he will register it in the Catalogue of his successful Experiments, and note it down as an additional Argument for his

Doctrine of *Necessity*. Nor is it indeed without an Appearance favourable to his Hypothesis; for it is not easy to conceive, that a Creature endued with Reason, and at Liberty to exercise it, should embrace so ill-founded, and so unpromising a System.

*Pro pudor! hæc tandem est doctæ sapientia scētæ! \**

\* Ant. Lucret.

T H E E N D.









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